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To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Ronald

No.

85-2039, United States v. Johnson

CA9 has before it a case arising out of this same accident.

When I was there, the panel to whom the case had been as-

signed called for

en bane on the basis of the

this case and Uptegrove

~.-- conflict

(the earlier CA9 precedent).

between

That call

I

was ~ejected, on the theory that the panel could not call for en
bane review at that time.

It is not clear whether the panel will

issue an opinion following Johnson or not.
Johnson,

the

confl~

will disappear.

If CA9 does follow

In any event, I think it

would be better to let this case go by and wait for at least one

post-Shearer
impressed

by

case
the

in

the

area.

argument

that

Although
Shearer

I

do not
requires

immediately
the

result

reached in Johnson, CAll thinks it does and a panel in the CA9
may think it does.

In these circumstances, more lower court con-

sideration may obviate the need of this Court's review.
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3

o-~~·

to

CAll

No. 85-2039
UNITED STATES

Cert
curiam,

(per
dis~

senting~

v.
-tJ4L.

JOHNSO
cutrix and
Fed. Tort Claim Act plaint.)

1.

Federal/Civil

..

Timely

SUMMARY:

that the executrix (resp) of a deceased member of the Coast Guard

v

was not precluded, under the doctrine of Peres v. United States,
from pursuing her claim under the Federal Torts Claim Act.

The

/

alleged negligence involves the conduct of an FAA flight controller resulting in the crash of a helicopter piloted by resp's husband.

-22.

Johnson, was a helicopter pi lot stationed

rnande r

call

to

storm.

rescue

During

a

the

in Hawaii

for

His Coast Guard Station received

the United States Coast Guard.
a

Resp's husband, Lt. Corn-

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

civilian vessel

lost

rescue operation,

in a

Lt.

Corn.

ability to pilot his helicopter visually,
assistance of an FAA flight controller.

serious Pacific
Johnson lost the

and he

requested

the

Shortly afterwards, the

helicopter crashed into the side of a mountain on the island of
Molokai, killing everyone on board.
Resp sought and received VA benefits for her husband's
death.l

In

Claims Act

addition,
(FTCA)

for

she

brought

suit

damages against

under

the Federal Tort

the U.s.

for

the alleged

negligence of the flight controller assisting her husband at the
time of the crash.
The v DC dismissed
doctrine
In

a

announced

in Feres

lengthy opinion,

the
v.

CAll held

action,

relying

United States. 2
that

the

solely

/

on

the

CAll reversed.

lirni tati ton

on FTCA

actions required by Feres v. United States should apply only in
situations which implicate "the delicate relationships which must
exist
Pet.

1

for
for

the

v

Cert.

military
A-28.

system to properly
In

its

opinion,

function."

CAll

announced

App.

to

a

new

Resp asserts whether she did or did not receive VA benefits
not part of the record.
340 u.s. 135 (1950). The Court in Feres expanded upon the
exception created in the FTCA for claims "arising out of the
combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the
Coast Guard, during time of war." 28 u.s.c. ) 2680(j). Under
the Feres doctrine, military personnel cannot recover under the
FTCA for injuries which "arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service."
~s

-3-

tortfeasor-focused test for determining whether an FTCA claim is
barred by the Feres doctrine:

if the FTCA suit involves alleged

negligence by a serviceman or an employee of the armed forces,
then the case fits within "the Feres factual paradigm" and the
action is automatically barred under Feres.

Id., at A-25.

If,

however, the tortfeasor is non-military, then an inquiry must be
made to determine whether, in light of the three rationales underlying the decision in Feres, allowance of the claim would circumvent the purposes of the FTCA.

Id.3

Although CAll does not

expressly say so, it appears from the opinion that the only rat ion ale

articulated

in

Fe res

that

justifies

barring

implicated FTCA claim is the military discipline one.4

a Fe resThe pa~el

acknowledged that its decision was squarely at odds with the conelusion reached by another circuit, CA9, dealing with very similar facts.

Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir.

19 7 9 ) , c e r t • den i e d ,

4 4 4 U • S • 1 0 4 4 ( 19 8 0 ) •

Uptegrove was "wrongly decided."

3

But CA 11 f e 1 t

that

App. to Pet. for Cert. A-30.

As noted in Stencel Aero Eng., there are three rationales
underlying the Feres doctrine: (1) The relationship between
members of the military and the government is "distinctively
federal in character." The government's liability to injured
servicemen should not depend upon in which state a serviceman is
injured. (2) VA, in effect, has a no-fault compensation scheme
that provides benefits irrespective of the government's fault.
This scheme is, therefore, the exclusive remedy for injured
sevicemen.
(3) "The peculiar and special relationship of the
soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such
suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if
suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders
given or negligent acts committed in the course of military
duty •••• " 431 u.s., at 671-72.
4
See App. to Pet. for Cert. A-27-29. See especially id., at
A-29 n. 11.

7

-4CAll,
this

Court

(1985).
forth

~hg

on

decided

en

United

bane,
States

affirmed
v.

its

Shearer,

decision
105

S.Ct.

3039

According to CAll, Shearer "reinforces the analysis set

in the panel opinion."

judges, however, dissented.
senters,

stated

that

App. to Pet. for Cert. A-4.

listed a number of

"no court until now has

allowed

recovery

Id., at A-7.

He

circuit cases, all relying upon Feres, which

deny military plaintiffs recovery.

Quoting this Court's opinion

in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431
(1977),

Four

Judge Johnson, writing for the dis-

against the government in this sort of suit."

669

after

u.s.

666,

Judge Johnson made the point that Feres stands for

the proposition that a military plaintiff cannot recover from the
government

if he or she

is

injured by a "government official,"

and such official does not necessarily have to be a member of the
military:

"' (i)n Feres .•• the Court held that an on-duty service-

man who is injured due to the negligence of Government officials
may not recover against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims

Act."'

Pet.

for

Cert.

A-10

(quoting

Stencel

Aero

Eng.) (emphasis in original).
3.

CONTENTIONS:

SG contends that CAll has created a

clear split among the circuits.
ly

contradicts

CA9 's

decision

Its opinion in this case directin

Uptegrove.

Moreover,

CAll's

decision is inconsistent with Feres and all Supreme Court cases
construing it.
Fe res'

CAll's decision particularly runs afoul of two of

rationales:

concerning

the mi 1 i tary discipline argument,

SG notes that the FAA works closely with the military.

To allow

suit against the FAA by members of the military would disrupt the

-5-

important and sensitive working relationship between the FAA and
the military.

Also,

"[i] t

would be

impossible

for

a trier of

fact to evaluate the conduct of the FAA air traffic controllers
in this case without considering the military nature of the mission."

Pet.

for Cert. 12.

SG states that the defense of con-

tributory negligence will certainly arise in this litigation if
CAll's decision stands, and this will in turn necessitate an inquiry into the wisdom and reasonableness of the military decision
to send Lt. Johnson out to rescue the distressed boat.

As for

the "workers-compensation" rationale, SG notes that resp received
VA benefits for her husband's death.
Resp acknowledges

the split created by CAll's deci-

sion, but believes the split is now "stale" in light of Shearer.
Resp takes issue with SG's characterization of the facts in this
case,

particularly in how the SG tries

nature of Lt. Johnson's mission.

to stress the military

According to resp, Shearer ade-

quately addressed the question presented here:

"there is simply

no

in

need

for

this

Court

to

grant

cert ior ar i

reannounce what it just announced in Shearer."
Opp. 7.

this

case

to

Resp.s Brief in

Resp also challenges SG's discussion on resp's receipt

of VA benefits, claiming that this is not part of the record.

4.

DISCUSSION:

CAll's decision squarely contradicts
-==="-

CA9's ·decision in Uptegrove, and cert should be granted to eliminate this conflict.

Furthermore,

if resp's reading of Shearer

is correct, then there appears to be a conflict between Shearer
and this Court's earlier opinion in Stencel Aero Eng.

Particu-

-6larly focusing on n.

4 in Shearer, resp correctly notes that the

Court suggested in Shearer that the rationales announced in Peres
other than military discipline (i.e., the "worker's-compensation"
and

"federal-nature-of-the-military"

controlling."

Shearer,

however,

theories)

are

"no

longer

cites approvingly Stencel Aero

Eng. which specifically relied upon the two "now-non-controlling"
factors.

431

u.s.,

at 672-73.

In other words, if this Court in

Shearer really wished to limit application of Peres to only those
situations

in

which mi 1 i tary discipline wi 11 be

jeopardized by

allowing a PTCA claim, such a rule is very difficult to discern
from this Court's existing case law.

This important point should

be clarified for the lower courts.
The issue posed by this case and as of yet unaddressed
by this Court is as follows: are military personnel, who are acting

in a

fashion

"incident to military service,"

Peres,

barred

from bringing an PTCA action against the federal government for
the negligence of non-military "government employees"?
~

held that military personnel are not so barred.

CAll has

I think that the

question is important enough to be answered by this Court.

5.

RECOMMENDATION:

I recommend granting cert.

There is a response.
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EMORANDUM

C/1;;~~~
~
To:
From:

P~ - -r~l ~

Justice Powell

ad-:
~

January 8, 1987

Cert. to CAll (en bane)

tiL-(~

(Johnson, Tjoflat, Roney, Hill, diss.)
Tuesday, Feb. 24, 1987 Cthird argument)
Summary

The question presented in this case is whether the
doctrine of

Feres

v.

United States,

340

U.S.

135

(1950),

bars an action on behalf of a serviceman whose decedent alleges that an FAA flight controller was negligent in guiding
the helicopter that the serviceman was piloting.

\)

~~

No. 85-2039, United States v. Johnson

I.

~

~~-~-- ~

e:v

Leslie

S?

page 2.

II.
Resp's

husband,

Background
Horton

Johnson,

helico~

a

was

pilot in the Coast Guard, stationed in Hawaii.

On Jan. 7,

1982, Johnson was dispatched to search for a civilian boat
in

Because

distress.

impossible,

bad

whether

made

visual

navigation

Johnson requested the civilian FAA controllers

to assume positive radar control over the helicopter.

The

controllers

the

did

so,

--------

side of a mountain.

and

the

helicopter

into

Johnson was killed in the crash.

Resp brought

children,

directed

his

action on behalf of herself,

and her husband's estate,

her

alleging negligence on

the part of the civilian air traffic controllers.

The Gov-

ernment filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that since resp's
decedent was killed while acting within the course and scope
of

his

military

duties,

the

complaint

failed

to

state a

claim upon which relief could be granted under the Federal
Tort Claims Act

Th~C

(FTCA).

dismissed the action.

---,

agreed,

citing Fe res,

A panel of the CAll. reversed.

CAll voted to hear the case en bane,

~nd

and
The

------

reinstated the pan-

el opinion.
The

CAll

undertook

a

lengthy

examination

of

the

Feres doctrine, concluding that "[r]egardless of the 'widespread,

almost

universal

critic ism of

federal courts and commentators,'
question that
ted).

it

is

the law.'"

Fe res

by

the

lower

it nonetheless 'is beyond
(numerous citations omit-

The CAll then proceeded to apply the doctrine.

Resp

argued that the inquiry under the Feres doctrine should be

C /}II /J~
cl- ~ b--~

~~
d..u-1 ~-r

page 3.

limited to whether the maintenance of the suit would have a
disruptive

effect

on military

discipline.

The

Government

---

argues that the Feres doctrine bars suit whenever a service-

____.,

man is killed in the course of military service.
declined

to

adopt

either of

these

approaches

and

The CAll
instead

found the key to the case to be that the suit was based on
civilian negligence.

According to the CAll:

[N) early

all the cases decided by referen
Feres involved the typical Feres factual
aradig
-- an FTCA suit for injuries of death al
y
caused "by the negligence of a serviceman or an
employee of the armed forces.
_._. • As we see it,
the teaching of Feres and its progeny .•. is that
when the Feres factual paradigm is present, the
issue is whether the injury arose out of or during
the course of an activity incident to service ..••
If, however, the alleged tortfeasor is not a member of the armed forces or a civilian employee
engaged in activities usually associated with the
armed forces, we conclude that a court should consult the Feres doctrine rationales as set forth in
Stencel "to determine to what extent, if any, the
allowance of [the] claim would circumvent the purposes of the
[FTCA]
as
construed by the
[Supreme] court."
Under this analysis,
doctrine did nc_:t bar

1'

the court found that the Feres

r...esp's FTCA suit.

It found the doc-

trine "best explained by the desire to avoid civilian court
inquiry into matters

that

the Supreme Court views as best

left beyond the pale of judicial scrutiny."
"no hint"

in

¥t>r

the

record

"that

The court found

the conduct of any alleged

tortfeasor even remotely connected with the military will be ~~
./\
~u
scrutinized if this case proceeds to trial."
The court ~
found no encroachment on the military discipline structure
and thus no reason to bar the suit.

~~

page 4.

The
the

CA9

CAll

in

acknowledged

Uptegrove

v.

(1979), cert. denied, 444
Navy

lieutenant

flying

the

United

u.s.

conflicting
States,

600

1044 (1980).

home on

leave as

decision of
F.

2d

1248

In that case, a
a military space

available passenger aboard an Air Force transport was killed
when

it crashed

into a mountain.

His wife brought a FTCA

action against the Government and three air traffic controlThe

lers.

CA9

concluded

that

the

lieutenant

was

killed

while engaged in activity incident to service and held that
the Fe res

doctrine

Supreme Court

has

barred
never

suit.

limited

The
the

CA9

found

that

the

applicability of

the

Feres doctrine to suits involving a threat to military discipline, and that the focus of the doctrine should be on the
serviceman's

military

tortfeasor.

status,

not

the

status

of

the

The CAll found Uptegrove "wrongly decided" and

expressly declined to follow it.
The
this

Court

(1984).

[A~~-3oted
in

Shearer

v.

the intervening decision by

United

States,

105

s.

Ct.

321 ~

It found the decision to be "helpful to [the] deci-

~

sion" and to "reinforc[e] the analysis set forth in the panel

opinion."

The

Feres doctrine
participate).
importance of

was

section

of

the

joined by eight

opinion

discussing

justices

(you did

the
not

That section placed special emphasis on the

~Tlitary - discipli~V

The CAll concluded:

The claims presented are based solely upon the
conduct of civilian employees of the FAA who were
not in any way involved in military activities.

.

..

page 5.

the fact that the decedent was a helicopter pilot
for the United States Coast Guard is not sufficient, stanoing alone, to activate Feres preclusion.

-------

Judge Johnson,

~vernment

~
ignored

found

three other

from suit when the injury to a serviceman is

"incident to service."
had

_

judges, dis______.....
~
The dissent found that the Feres doctrine exempts

sented.

joined by

The dissent found that the majority

binding precedent

in reaching

its result.

the military status of the alleged tortfeasor

immaterial

since

the

FTCA

applies

to

"the

It

to be

negligent

or

wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government."
Thus,

the

true Feres

factual

paradigm

injury to a serviceman is caused by

is

a

case

~government

in which
employee.

This would apply to this case.
III.

Analysis

Both the Government and resp find support for their
position

in

this Court's previous cases.

A chronological

-----

review of these cases indicates the development of the doctrine.

A.

Relevant Precedent

In Brooks v. United States, 337

u.s.

49

Cl949), the

Court addressed a case in which two off-duty servicemen were
killed and injured in a car accident due to the negligence
of a civilian Army employee driving an Army truck on a publie highway.

The Court characterized the injury suffered as

not incident to service and allowed recovery.
the Court:

According to

1f1

~

~

~~

~

A~

.3~

... ()

1
~

page 6.

The Government envisages dire consequences
should we [allow recovery].
A battle commander's
poor judgment, an army surgeon's slip of hand, a
defective jeep which causes injury, all would
ground tort actions against the United States.
But we are dealing with an accident which had
nothing to do with the [servicemen's] army careers, injuries not caused by their service except
in the sense that all human events depend upon
what has already transpired.
Were the accident
incident to the [servicemen's] service, a wholly
different case would be presented.
Id., at 52.

The Court did not find the fact that the serv-

icemen and their beneficiaries would receive veteran's benefits

Instead,

dispositive.

it

found

that

the

amount

re-

ceived in benefits could be considered in determining recovery under the FTCA.

~

In Feres v.
serviceman died

United States,

in a

fire

in

340

u.s.

135

army barracks,

(1950),

and his wife

brought suit alleging that the Government was negligent
quartering him in barracks known to be unsafe.
decided
all

three cases

three

cases

was

together.
that

The common

"each claimant,

a

fact

in

The Court
underlying

while on active

duty and not on furlough, sustained injury due to negligence
of others

in

the

broadly stated,
permitted

a

armed

forces."

Id.,

at

138.

The Court

"We know of no American law which ever has

soldier

to

recover

for

negligence,

against

either his superior officers of the Government he is serving."
ment

Id.,
is not

at 141.
liable

The Court concluded that "the Governunder

the Federal Tort Claims Act

injuries to servicemen where the

for

injuries arise out of or

page 7.

are in the course of activity incident to service."
146.

In

~ed

States v. Brown,

u.s.

348

110

Id., at

(1954),

a

discharged veteran brought suit for negligent treatment of
his knee in a Veteran's Administration Hospital.

The knee

injury occurred while the veteran was on active duty and led
to his honorable discharge.

The Court noted:

The Feres decision did not disapprove of the
Brooks case.
It merely distinguished it, holding
that the Tort Claims Act does not cover 'injuries
to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or
are in the course of activity incident to service.' •.. The peculiar and special relationship of
the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the
maintenance of such suits on di~i£line, and the
extreme results that might obtainl.r suits under
the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent
orders given or negligent acts committed in the
course of military duty, led the Court to read
that Act as excluding claims of that character.
Id., at 112.
not Feres.

The Court viewed Brown as governed by Brooks,
The

injury for

which suit was brought did not

occur while the serviceman was on active duty or subject to
military discipline.

Moreover,

foreign

pattern of

to

the

broad

undertook in the FTCA.

the

type of claim was not

liability

the

Government

The Court affirmed that while Con-

gress could have made veteran's benefits an exclusive remedy,

it had not done so.

Consequently, the availability of

the benefits does not preclude suit.
to

the

line drawn

in

The Court "adhere[d)

the Feres case between injuries

that did and injuries that did not arise out of or
course of military duty,"

in the

finding that this injury did not

arise out of the course of military duty.

Id., at 113.

page 8.

In~d

States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 !1963), the

Court held that a federal prisoner could sue under the FTCA
for personal injuries suffered in prison due to the negligence of a

government

employee.

The Government argued

in

that case that the Feres doctrine should preclude suit.

The

Court

the

rejected

this

argument.

The

Court

articulated

reasons behind the Feres doctrine:
(1)
the absence of an analogous or parallel liability, on the part of either an individual or a
State; no individual has power to mobilize a militia, no State had been held liable to its militiamen;
(2)
the presence of a comprehensive compensation system for service personnel;
C3)
the
dearth of private bills from the military;
(4)
the distinctly federal relationship of the soldier
to his superiors and the Government, which should
not be disturbed by state laws;
and (5)
the
variations in state law to which soldiers would be
subjected,
involuntarily,
since they have no
choice in where they go.

Id.,

at

The

159.

Court

stated

that

Feres

is

"best

ex-

plained" by the adverse effect on military discipline that
would

resu ~ rom

such suits.

In Stence
431

u.s.

for

an

fighter

a National Guard officer brought suit

666

injury

when

aircraft

the

malfunctioned

ejection

during

a

system

midair

of

his

emergency.

The officer sued the United States and the government contractor who manufactured the faulty system.

The contractor

cross-claimed against the Government, alleging that the malfunction

was

due

supplied

by

the

to

faulty

Government.

Stencel was whether

specifications
The

question

and

components

presented

in

the right of a third party to recover

9~

-

page 9.

from the Government in an indemnity action is limited by the
Fe res doctrine.

The Court concluded that "the third-party

indemnity action in this case is unavailable for essentially
the

same

Feres."

reasons

that

the direct action

is barred by

Id., at 673.
This

time,

the

Court

behind the Feres decision.
the

...

Government

character".

and

Thus,

First,

servicemen
the

identified

is

"distinctly

Government's

federal

liability

to

in

service

members should not depend upon the vagaries of state law.
Second,

servicemen are

subject

to a

no-fault compensation

system.

For the first time, the Court stated that "the mil-

itary compensation scheme provides an upper limit of liability

for

the Government

Id., at 673.
pline.

as

to

service-connected

injuries."

Third, the suits would disrupt military disci-

The Court found the effect of a third-party suit on

military discipline to be the same as a direct suit.
In

462

enlisted

u.s.
his

alleging

that

they

basis of

race

in

evaluations.

The

discriminated

making
Court

duty

296

Navy

(1983),

superior

officers,

against

the

men

assignments

and

performance

reiterated

that

Feres

explained by the military discipline rationale,

on

seems

the

best

concluding

"Civilian courts must, at the very least, hesitate long before entertaining a suit which asks the court to tamper with
the

enlisted personnel and

relationship

is

at

the

their

heart

of

superior officers;
the

necessarily

that
unique

page 10.

structure of the Military Establishment."

Id., at 300.

The

Court thus concluded that enlisted military personnel were
not entitled to bring a Bivens action against their superior
officers.

_______

......___
Most

recently,

s.

Shearer, 105

the Court decided

Ct. 3039 (1985).

~ ted

States v.

In that case, an Army pri-

-------r---

1I

vate was kidnapped and killed by a fellow servicemari while
The
Government,

private's

alleging

mother

that

the

brought

Army

suit

against

negligently

failed

the
to

exercise sufficient control over the killer, whom it knew to

be dangerous.

The Court found that Feres barred the suit.

The Court reiterated that the military discipline rationale
is the primary reason behind Feres.

It noted that the lower

court had placed emphasis on the fact that the private was
off duty and away from the base when he was murdered.
Court stated,

"[T] he situs of the murder

The

is not nearly as

important as whether the suit requires the civilian court to
second-guess

military decisions,

and whether

might impair essential military discipline."

the

Id., at 3043.

The suit at issue went to the heart of these concerns.
"call[ed]

It

into question basic choices about the discipline,

supervision, and control of a serviceman."
distinguished Brooks,

Ibid.

The Court

"Unlike the negligence alleged in the

operation of a vehicle,
officers

suit

the claim here would

require Army

'to testify in court as to each other's decisions

and actions."'

Id., at 3044.

page 11.

B.
The

present

Application

case

involves

an

on-duty

serviceman

whose death occurred while he was on a mission directed by
his superiors.
ry arose

Under the broad language of Feres, his inju-

"out of or

service."

in the course of activity incident to

340 U.S., at 146.

Some of the rationales articu-

lated in this Court's previous decision would apply to this

case. ~~maintenance

of

th ~pe

of suit would subject

the Government and servicemen to the vagaries of state law.

~,

~
eran's

·-------

resp has applied for and received the statutory vet-

-

benefits for her husband's death.

compensation scheme"
ability

for

the

ries," Stencel,

If the "military

truly "provides an upper limit of li-

Government
431 U.S.,

as

to

at 673,

service-connected

inju-

then resp's suit may be

precluded.
The counterargument

is

that what

has

consistently

been identified as the primary rationale for Feres -- disruption of military discipline -- is arguably not present in
this case.
does not

The suit is against FAA flight controllers.
involve

second~ng

It ~.J.

of command decisions, and

does not involve the assessment of how any essentially military action was performed.

The Government would be liable

to any civilian who demonstrated
gence.

Thus,

flight

controller

negli-

this suit does not subject the Government to

unique
liability.
,__-

----,

The Government argues that maintenance of this type
of suit would indeed disrupt military discipline.

It argues

L-t..>

dL'9~
1="/1 A

~~

-

~-~-

~~
~·

/3 ~ /V~
v-s J4t L( ~
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that FAA personnel are often called upon to advise the military and assist in directing military missions.
ly,

According-

inquiry into their conduct would disrupt the important

working relationship between the FAA and the military. 1

The

Government also argues that a jury could not evaluate the
conduct of the flight controllers without considering the
military nature of

the mission

involved.

"At trial,

the

United States would be required to show that the air traffic
controllers acted reasonably, which might require testimony
describing the hazardous nature of the conditions, the danger

involved

in

the

particular

rescue

mission,

and

the

pressing need to fly in weather not suited for civilian aircraft."

Brief for United States 18.

It argues that this

type of case would involve questions of contributory negligence, requiring servicemen to testify against each other in
court.
I (

'-'

There appears to be a strong need for a clear rule
in this area.

~~ clear ru ~ is advocated by the Government

a suit respecting any injury incurred during the course
of military service is barred.

The CAll adopted a different

lThis argument is very similar to the Government's argument in
military contractor cases, which comprise a subset of the Feres
doc r1ne cases.
rt has recently granted cert in a case to
determine the extent of the so-called "military contractor
defense". The lower courts have generally held that where the
Government participates substantially in the manufacture and
design of military equipment, the contractor shares the
Government's immunity from a suit brought by a serviceman injured
by the product. You will be recused from consideration of this
case.

page 13.

clear rule -- a suit respecting an injury incurred during
~

the course of military service is barred if the tortfeasor
is also a member of the rnili tary.
civilian,

a

If the tortfeasor is a

case-by-case analysis according

to

the

ratio-

cA

II S'

''c.Le~

~

nales of Peres is required.
The f overnrnent-;s
er.

The Government's

- ~~

has the virtue of being

c~ r

rule encompasses·
all cases in which
,.......

the military discipline concern is present.

Since it bars

practically all suits by servicemen, it also bars almost all
cases in which the injured party receives statutory servicemen's compensation.
extent
with

the

In addition,

possibility

that

its servicemen will

it precludes to a greater

the Government's

relationship

be influenced by different state

laws.
The ~All~ s

~

is more narrowly tailored to address

the military discipline concern.
--

It bars all cases in which

~

the concern is most likely to be present -- suits against
military personnel for injuries arising out of service.
all other cases,

it requires a case-by-case determination,

ostensibly according

to all Peres

pr irnar ily

to

Thus,

according

the CAll's

For

factors,

but presumably

the rnili tary discipline

rationale.

rule would allow some servicemen's suits

despite the fact that the servicemen received statutory cornpensation and despite the fact

that state law would some-

times determine a serviceman's recovery from the Government.
A reasoned decision could be written either way in
this case.

On balance, the Government's proposed rule sirn-

13

lA-

1?~~
~
)~
~~~....

I q'tn/f-

~~

~·
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ply appears too broad. 2

The Government's rule would seem to

mean that a serviceman who is driving on a public street to
deliver a package for his commander and who is struck by a
post office vehicle driven recklessly at 90 m.p.h. would not
be able to bring suit against the Government to recover damages.

This result does not appear correct.

consistently stated that the

This Court has

\~ary di~ pli ~ rationa~

is the primary basis for the Feres doctrine.
appears consistent with this emphasis.

The CAll rule

The CAll's rule bars]

all suits where military discipline is genuinely endangered.

(;0 1 ;'s
~

It allows suits where military discipline is only a speculative concern.
A further
propriate.

The other rationales for the Feres doctrine

been mentioned,
opinions.

refinement on the CAll's rule may be ap-

but

not

emphasized

in

the

Court's

]3J q_

have ~

recent

The clearest route may be to state that the ef-

feet on military discipline is the controlling consideration
under Feres.

Thus, where a serviceman sues military person-

nel, suit would be

barred~

where a serviceman sues nonmili-

tary personnel, a court would have to determine whether the

I

suit would endanger military discipline.

Limiting the Feres

considerations

would

to

military

discipline

give

lower

2Resp argues that this Court in Shearer implicitly rejected the
Government's position in the following statement: "The Feres
doctrine cannot be reduced t?,&_ few bright-line rules; each case
must be examined in light of~ statute as it has been construed
in Feres and subsequent cases." 105 S. Ct., at 3043.
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courts a clear basis upon which to evaluate numerous different permutations of servicemen's claims.

Because military

personnel would be assured that suit would be barred whenever their command decisions are at issue, they should not be
chilled in conducting their military activities.

-

The CAll's rule, which is admittedly less clear than
the Government's bright-line rule, only has value if there
--~~-·--- -

is a reason to allow suits on behalf of servicemen in cer-

--------

tain circumstances .

--~----------·-·----------

One

. . . _ _ _ _ . - - - - - _. _ ..,

allowed

to

recover

reason may be that civilians are

damages

for

negligence,

despite

other

available sources of compensation, and servicemen should be
able to do the same absent the military discipline rationale.

Another reason may be that tort suits provide a check

on individual and corporate behavior, and this check should
be removed only when there are countervailing interests to
be served.

If these reasons are not convincing, the Govern-

ment's proposal may be the one to adopt.
IV.

Conclusion

The Government argues that the Feres doctrine should

--

bar suit for any injury incurred in the course of military
service.

~ought

This

is a broad rule

by servicemen.

to~y o~

--

personnel.

Other

suits

that bars almost all suits

The ~All refine~ the

Feres

doctrine/~

those suits brought against military ~~ would

concerns articulated in Feres.

be

evaluated

by

the

policy ~-

A further refinement on the

CAll's approach would be to evaluate claims against nonmili-

page 16.

tary personnel only according to the effect on military discipline.
The CAll's approach is the one to adopt if the effeet
Feres.

on military

discipline

is

the

primary concern

under

This approach would allow suits that only marginally

implicated the conduct of military affairs.
the other

rationales

vitality,

e.g.,

supporting

In contrast, if

the Fe res doctrine

reh.ain

that suits between servic~~en and the Gov-

________

ernrnent should not-......._......
be subject
to conflicting state laws and
------------......__
that

the

comprehensive

should be exclusive,

benefits

received

by

servicemen

then the broader rule proposed by the

Government is the appropriate standard.

I
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JOHNSON SALLY-POW
MEMORANDUM

TO:

Leslie

DATE:

March 14 , 19 8 7

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
85-2039 United States v. Johnson
First,

my

thanks

first draft so promptly.
night,

and,

draft

subject

is quite

an

for

giving

me your

March

13

I gave it an initial review last

to what

is

achievement

said

below,

think your

of quality writing

in a

short period of time.
The first 25 pages of the draft seem a bit long.
These

pages

are

devoted

primarily

to

a

review

of

the

relevant precedents and these are numerous -

including CA

decisions.

suggest

Despite

the

length,

I

do

not

any

specific attempt to shorten this portion of the opinion.
Indeed,

I

think

we

are

justified

in

leaving

it

substantially as you have drafted it.
I do have some difficulty with III-B (pp. 24-35).
The problem arises primarily from what was said in United
States

v.

Shearer,

our

most

recent

relevant

decision.

That case can be read as a significant departure from the
rationale of the long line of prior decisions.
that

"Fe res

seems

best

explained"

by

the

It did say
military

2.

discipline rationale,

and that the other grounds for the

Feres are "no longer controlling • • • "
out,

there

is a

difference

But, as you point

between saying

that

certain

grounds are "no longer controlling", and saying that these
grounds are no longer relevant at all.

As you note,

two

of the original Feres grounds were repeated in Shearer.
I think Subpart B is too long.
me

that

it

"military

is

a

mistake

discipline

to

basis"

focus
that

Also, it seems to
primarily

may

not

on

have

the
been

mentioned until Stencel Aero and more recently in Shearer.
We do not have to assume that "military discipline" is now
the primary rationale for denying Tort Claims Act suits.
See my

suggested

Shearer.

rider,

p.

22,

in which

I

comment

on

I think we properly can view the reference to

"military discipline" as being made in the broadest sense
that is applicable, at least potentially, in all of these
cases.

I would come back repeatedly to Justice Jackson's

conclusion in Feres that the government is not liable for
injuries "to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or
are in the course of activity incident to service".

The

entire military service depends, of course, on discipline,
and

in

this

pertinent

to

case
Coast

Johnson
Guard

was

obeying

service

when

orders
he

directly

flew

this

3.

helicoper mission.

The language in Shearer, as well as in

Stencel is not inconsistent with this view.
Military
essential
said,

discipline,

component

in this case,

of

of

course,

military

service.

is
It

itself

an

could

be

that Johnson was acting pursuant to

military discipline when he properly relied on the service
provided by another federal agency.
violated discipline had he

Indeed, he would have

ignored the availability of

this service and crashed at some other place.
L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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TO:

Leslie

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 17, 1987

85-2039 United States v. Johnson
Your revision of pages 23 to the first paragraph
on

p.

32

is

excellent.

I

continue

difficulty with the treatment of the

to

~military

have

some

discipline"

language in Shearer, beginning with the first paragraph on
p. 32 through p. 36.
This portion of

the draft seems to accept

Shearer reference to "military discipline" as a

holding

that

the

"military discipline".
far.

basis
I

of

the

Fe res

the

in effect

doctrine

is

do not think we need go this

It seems to me that what you have said about Shearer

in the paragraph that begins on p. 21 is almost all that
need be said.

Although the Court stated that Fe res is

best

explained

by

Chief

Justice

cannot

be

the

Burger's

reduced

to

11

mil i tary

opinion
bright

draft.

is

line

identified additional rationales.

rationale 11 ,

discipline
explicit
rules,

that

and

he

Feres
then

See pp. 22, 23 of your

2.

I would not use language (see p. 32) that appears
to accept military discipline as the basis of the Fe res
doctrine except in the broadest sense of that term.
have

discussed,

discipline

is

at

the core of

As we

military

service, and the essence of discipline is that regulations
and orders must be complied with unhesitatingly.
case,

Johnson was

orders when

he

on

duty

undertook

and was

acting

In this

pursuant

the mission on which

to

he was

killed.
I doubt the desirability of saying much more than
the

foregoing.

I

suggest

that you omit

the paragraph

beginning on p.

32

and continuing through the top two

lines of p. 35.

Your cite to Hass on p. 34 is good but I

believe I would omit this also.
Footnote 12, with some revision, is helpful.
I have suggested possible language changes in the
paragraph that commences on p. 35, and - subject to your
views - I am inclined to omit what you now have on p. 36.
In other words, try ending the draft with language along
the lines I suggest at the end of p. 35.

I view the case

as involving a command decision and a mission that - like
all

military

missions

broader sense of the term.

implicates

discipline

in

the

3.

* * *
I hesitate to seem so positive,

as I know that

you have thought about this a good deal more than I have.
I nevertheless have the feeling that Part III at present
is wover arguedu, and also emphasizes problems that relate
to

litigation

unpersuasive.

(see

p.

33)

that

think

are

rather

If the dissent requires it, we can use your

ideas in rebuttal.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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,jtqtrtnu <!fou.d of tqt ~b ,jtatta
'llaafrington. ~. <!f. 2ll.;tJ!.~.
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

March 24, 1987

Re: No. 85-2039-U.S. v. Johnson
Dear Lewis:
I await the dissent.
Sincerely,

r.
);1,
T.M.
Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.ittp'rtmt Qj:.m:t of tlft ~ittb .itidts

,rulfiqtcn. J. Qj:.

2ll~,.~

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA

v

March 24, 1987

Re:

No. 85-2039 - United States v. Johnson r

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
In due course, I will circulate a dissent in the above case.
Sincerely,

.jtt¥ftntt ataud .ttf tqt ~ttitth .jta:b,«
'Jila:,gltittgton,~.
CHAMBERS

"t·

2llbi~~ .

/

Or

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

March 25, 1987

Re:

85-2039

U.S. v. Johnson

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~u.prtutt

<!fltltrl of tqt ~b .§btftg

Jfagfringhrn. ~. <!f.

2ll~~~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 26, 1987

Re:

85-2039 - United States v. Johnson

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

\

~upuutt ~llltrt

llf tJr~ Jlnit~lt ~hrl~g
Jfa,glfiugt&tn, ~. ~· 20,?~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

March 26, 1987

Re:

85-2039 - United States v. Johnson

Dear Lewis:
I will wait for the dissent.
Respectfully,

<JL
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

,jttpttutt <!f.rttrlltf tfrt Jn±ttb ,jtatt.&'
~fringtmt. ~.<If. 2ll.;t~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

March 31, 1987

I
85-2039 - United States v. Johnson

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~JtVUlttt ~ourl of tlft ~ttittb _itaf.tg

._,uJringto:u:. ~. ~· 2ll?Jl..;l
CHA MBE R S OF"

April 2, 1987

JUSTI CE HAR R Y A . BLA C KM U N

Re: No. 85-2039, United States v. Johnson
Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
I must confess that I do not
understand footnote 9 on page 7.
Would you consider
clarifying it or omitting it altogether?
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

..ittpTtutt ClJttttrl ttl tift ~b Jtaftg

~u~ ~. ctJ. 2llbi~~
CHAMeER S 00"

JUSTICE

W~< .

J . BRENNAN, JR.

May 6, 1987

No. 85-2039
United States v. Johnson

Dear Nino,
Thanks so very much.

Please join

me in your dissent in the above.
Sincerely,
,"'1

JiiQ

Justice Scalia
Copies to the Conference

,u:prtnu <!Jttnrl of tlrt ~ttb ~brltlf
:JlmrJrin:ghtn, ~. <!J. 2Ll~~~
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

v
May 5, 1987

Re:

85-2039 - United States v. Johnson

Dear Nino:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Scalia
Copies to the Conference

.CHANGES AS MAH.h...ED:

I , I '2.---
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~
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J.E, ~ i.f.- ~
~~

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Powell
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor
From:

Justice Scalia

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: · MAY

SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 85-2039
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. FRIEDA JOYCE
JOHNSON, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF HORTON WINFIELD JOHNSON, DECEASED,
ETC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[May - , 1987]

JusTICE ScALIA, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and Jus- I
TICE STEVENS join, dissenting.
\
As it did almost four decades ago in Feres v. United States,
340 U. S. 135 (1950), the Court today provides several reasons why Congress might have been wise to exempt from the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346(b),
2671-2680, certain claims brought by servicemen. The problem now, as then, is that Congress not only failed to provide
such an exemption, but quite plainly excluded it. We have
not been asked by the respondent here to overrule Feres; but
I can perceive no reason to accept the petitioner's invitation
to extend it as the Court does today.

I
Much of the sovereign immunity of the United States was
swept away in 1946 with passage of the FTCA, which renders the Government liable
"for money damages ... for injury or loss of property,
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United

9 19a l
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States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred." 28 U. S. C. § 1346(b).
Read as it is written, this language renders the United States
liable to all persons, including servicemen, injured by the
negligence of government employees. Other provisions of
the Act set forth a number of exceptions, but none generally
precludes FTCA suits brought by servicemen. One, in fact,
excludes "[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities
of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during
time of war," § 2680(j) (emphasis added), demonstrating that
Congress specifically considered, and provided what it
thought needful for, the special requirements of the military.
There was no proper basis for us to supplement-i. e., revise-that congressional disposition.
In our first encounter with an FTCA suit brought by a serviceman, we gave effect to the plain meaning of the statute.
In Brooks v. United States, 337 U. S. 49 (1949), military personnel had been injured in a collision with an Army truck
while off duty. We rejected the Government's argument
that those injured while enlisted in the military can never recover under the FTCA. We noted that the Act gives the
District Courts "jurisdiction over any claim founded on negligence brought against the United States" and found the Act's
exceptions "too lengthy, specific, and close to the present
problem" to permit an inference that, notwithstanding the literal language of the statute, Congress intended to bar all
suits brought by servicemen. I d., at 51. Particularly in
light of the exceptions for claims arising out of combatant activities, 28 U. S. C. § 2680(j), and in foreign countries,
§ 2680(k), we said, "[i]t would be absurd to believe that Congress did not have the servicemen in mind" in passing the
FTCA. 337 U. S., at 51. We therefore concluded that the
plaintiffs in Brooks could sue under the Act. In dicta, however, we cautioned that an attempt by a serviceman to recover for injuries suffered "incident to ... service" would

.
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present "a wholly different case," id., at 52, and that giving
effect to the "literal language" of the FTCA in such a case
might lead to results so "outlandish" that recovery could not
be permitted, id., at 53.
That "wholly different case" reached us one year later in
Feres. We held that servicemen could not recover under the
FTCA for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service," 340 U. S., at 146, and gave
three reasons for our holding. First, the parallel private liability required by the FTCA was absent. ld., at 141-142.
Second, Congress could not have intended that local tort law
govern the "distinctively federal" relationship between the
Government and enlisted personnel. ld., at 142-144.
Third, Congress could not have intended to make FTCA suits
available to servicemen who have already received veterans'
benefits to compensate for injuries suffered incident to service. ld., at 144-145. Several years after Feres we thought
of a fourth rationale: Congress could not have intended to
permit suits for service-related injuries because they would
unduly interfere with military discipline. United States v.
Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112 (1954).
In my view, none of these rationales justifies the result.
Only the first of them, the "parallel private liability" argument, purports to be textually based, as follows: The United
States is liable under the FTCA "in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances," 28 U. S.C. §2674; since no "private individual"
can raise an army, and since no state has consented to suits
by members of its militia, § 2674 Shields the Government
from liability in the Feres situation. 340 U. S., at 141-142.
Under this reasoning, of course, many of the Act's exceptions
are superfluous, since private individuals typically do not, for
example, transmit postal matter, 28 U. S. C. § 2680(b), collect taxes or customs duties, § 2680(c), impose quarantines,
§ 2680(f), or regulate the monetary system,§ 2680(i). In any
event, we subsequently recognized our error and rejected
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Feres's "parallel private liability" rationale. See Rayonier,
Inc. v. United States, 352 U. S. 315, 319 (1957); Indian
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61, 66-69 (1955).
Perhaps without that scant (and subsequently rejected)
textual support, which could be pointed to as the embodiment
of the legislative intent that its other two rationales speculated upon, the Feres Court would not as an original matter
have reached the conclusion that it did. Be that as it may,
the speculation outlived the textual support, and the Feres
rule is now sustained only by three disembodied estimations
of what Congress must (despite what it enacted) have intended. They are bad estimations at that. The first of
them, Feres's second rationale, has barely escaped the fate of
the "parallel private liability" argument, for though we have
not yet acknowledged that it is erroneous we have described
it as "no longer controlling." United States v. Shearer, 473
U. S. 52, 58, n. 4 (1985). The rationale runs as follows: Liability under the FTCA depends upon "the law of the place
where the [negligent] act or omission occurred," 28 U. S. C.
§ 1346(b); but Congress could not have intended local, and
therefore geographically diverse, tort law to control important aspects of the "distinctively federal" relationship between the United States and enlisted personnel. 340 U. S.,
at 142-144. Feres itself was concerned primarily with the
unfairness to the soldier of making his recovery turn upon
where he was injured, a matter outside of his control. /d.,
at 142-143. Subsequent cases, however, have stressed the
military's need for uniformity in its governing standards.
See, e. g., Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,
431 U. S. 666, 672 (1977). Regardless of how it is understood, this second rationale is not even a good excuse in policy, much less in principle, for ignoring the plain terms of the
FTCA.
The unfairness to servicemen of geographically varied recovery is, to speak bluntly, an absurd justification, given
that, as we have pointed out in another context, nonuniform
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recovery cannot possibly be worse than (what Feres provides) uniform nonrecovery. See United States v. Muniz,
374 U. S. 150, 162 (1963). We have abandoned this peculiar
rule of solicitude in allowing federal prisoners (who have no
more control over their geographical location than servicemen) to recover under the FTCA for injuries caused by the
negligence of prison authorities. See ibid. There seems to
me nothing "unfair" about a rule which says that, just as a
serviceman injured by a negligent civilian must resort to
state tort law, so must a serviceman injured by a negligent
government employee.
To the extent that the rationale rests upon the military's
need for uniformity, it is equally unpersuasive. To begin
with, that supposition of congressional intent is positively
contradicted by the text. Several of the FTCA's exemptions
show that Congress considered the uniformity problem, see,
e. g., 28 U. S. C. §§ 2680(b), 2680(i), 2680(k), yet it chose to
retain sovereign immunity for only some claims affecting the
military. § 2680(j). Moreover, we have effectively disavowed this "uniformity" justification-and rendered its
benefits to military planning illusory- by permitting servicemen to recover under the FTCA for injuries suffered not incident to service, and permitting civilians to recover for injuries caused by military negligence. See, e. g., Indian
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955). Finally, it
is difficult to explain why uniformity (assuming our rule were
achieving it) is indispensable for the military, but not for the
many other federal departments and agencies that can be
sued under the FTCA for the negligent performance of their
"unique, nationwide function[s]," Stencel Aero Engineering
Corp. v. United States, supra, at 675 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), including, as we have noted, the federal prison system which may be sued under varying state laws by its inmates. See United States v. Muniz, supra. In sum, the
second Feres rationale, regardless of how it is understood, is
not a plausible estimation of congressional intent, much less a
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justification for importing that estimation, unwritten, into
the statute.
Feres's third basis has similarly been denominated "no
longer controlling." United States v. Shearer, supra, at 58,
n. 4. Servicemen injured or killed in the line of duty are
compensated under the Veterans' Benefits Act (VBA), 72
Stat. 1118, as amended, 38 U. S.C. §301 et seq. (1982 ed.
and Supp. III), and the Feres Court thought it unlikely that
Congress meant to permit additional recovery under the
FTCA, 340 U. S., at 144-145. Feres described the absence
of any provision to adjust dual recoveries under the FTCA
and VBA as "persuasive [evidence] that there was no awareness that the Act might be interpreted to permit recovery for
injuries incident to military service." I d., at 144. Since
Feres we have in dicta characterized recovery under the
VBA as "the sole remedy for service-connected injuries,"
Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460, 464
(1980) (per curiam), and have said that the VBA "provides an
upper limit of liability for the Government" for those injuries,
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at
673.

The credibility of this rationale is undermined severely by
the fact that both before and after Feres we permitted injured servicemen to bring FTCA suits, even though they had
been compensated under the VBA. In Brooks v. United
States, 337 U. S. 49 (1949), we held that two servicemen injured off duty by a civilian Army employee could sue the Government. The fact that they had already received VBA
benefits troubled us little. We pointed out that "nothing in
the Tort Claims Act or the veterans' laws . . . provides for
exclusiveness of remedy" and we refused to "call either remedy . . . exclusive ... when Congress has not done so." I d.,
at 53. We noted further that Congress had included three
exclusivity provisions in the FTCA, 28 U. S. C. §§ 2672,
2676, 2679, but had said nothing about servicemen plaintiffs,
337 U. S., at 53. We indicated, however, that VBA com-
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pensation could be taken into account in adjusting recovery
under the FTCA. I d., at 53-54; see also United States v.
Brown, 348 U. S., at 111, and n. *. That Brooks remained
valid after Feres was made clear in United States v. Brown,
supra, in which we stressed again that because "Congress
had given no indication that it made the right to compensation [under the VBA] the veteran's exclusive remedy, ...
the receipt of disability payments ... did not preclude recovery under the Tort Claims Act." Id., at 113.
Brooks and Brown (neither of which has ever been expressly disapproved) plainly hold that the VBA is not an "exclusive" remedy which places an "upper limit" on the Government's liability. Because of Feres and today's decision,
however, the VBA will in fact be exclusive for service-connected injuries, but not for others. Such a result can no
more be reconciled with the text of the VBA than with that of
the FTCA, since the VBA compensates servicemen without
regard to whether their injuries occur "incident to service" as
Feres defines that term. See 38 U. S. C. § 105. Moreover,
the VBA is not, as Feres assumed, identical to federal and
state workers' compensation statutes in which exclusivity
provisions almost invariably appear. See, e. g., 5 U. S. C.
§ 8116(c). Recovery is possible under workers' compensation statutes more often than under the VBA, and VBA
benefits can be terminated more easily than can workers'
compensation. -8ee Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should
Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77
Mich. L. Rev. 1099, 1106-1108 (1979). In sum, "the presence of an alternative compensation system [neither] explains
[n]or justifies the Feres doctrine; it only makes the effect of
the doctrine more palatable." Hunt v. United States, 204
U. S. App. D. C. 308, 326, 636 F. 2d 580, 598 (1980).
The foregoing three rationales-the only ones actually relied upon in Feres-are so frail that it is hardly surprising
that we have repeatedly cited the later-conceived-of "military
discipline" rationale as the "best" explanation for that deci-
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sion. See United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 57; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 299 (1983); United States v.
Muniz, 374 U. S., at 162. Applying the FTCA as written
would lead, we have reasoned, to absurd results, because if
suits could be brought on the basis of alleged negligence towards a serviceman by other servicemen, military discipline
would be undermined and civilian courts would be required to
second-guess military decisionmaking. See Stencel Aero
Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S., at 671-672,
673. (Today the Court goes further and suggests that permitting enlisted men and women to sue their Government on
the basis of negligence towards them by any government employee seriously undermines "duty and loyalty to one's service and to one's country." Ante, at 9.) I cannot deny the
possibility that some suits brought by servicemen will adversely affect military discipline, and if we were interpreting
an ambiguous statute perhaps we could take that into account. But I do not think the effect upon military discipline
is so certain, or so certainly substantial, that we are justified
in holding (if we can ever be justified in holding) that Congress did not mean what it plainly said in the statute before
us.
It is strange that Congress' "obvious" intention to preclude
Feres suits because of their effect on military discipline was
discerned neither by the Feres Court nor by the Congress
that enacted the FTCA (which felt it necessary expressly to
exclude recovery for combat injuries). Perhaps Congress
recognized that the likely effect of Feres suits upon military
discipline is not as clear as we have assumed, but in fact has
long been disputed. See Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline, and the Weapons of War, 29 St. Louis U. L. J. 383,
407-411 (1985). Or perhaps Congress assumed that the
FTCA's explicit exclusions would bar those suits most threatening to military discipline, such as claims based upon combat
command decisions, 28 U. S. C. § 2680(j); claims based upon
performance of "discretionary" functions, § 2680(a); claims
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ar1smg in foreign countries, § 2680(k); intentional torts,
§ 2680(h); and claims based upon the execution of a statute or
regulation, § 2680(a). Or perhaps Congress assumed that,
since liability under the FTCA is imposed upon the Government, and not upon individual employees, military decisionmaking was unlikely to be affected greatly. Or perhapsmost fascinating of all to contemplate-Congress thought
that barring recovery by servicemen might adversely affect
military discipline. After all, the morale of Lieutenant Commander Johnson's comrades-in-arms will not likely be
boosted by news that his widow and children will receive only
a fraction of the amount they might' have recovered had he
been piloting a commercial helicopter at the time of his death.
To the extent that reading the FTCA as it is written will
require civilian courts to examine military decisionmaking
and thus influence military discipline, it is outlandish to consider that result "outlandish," Brooks v. United States, 337
U. S., at 53, since in fact it occurs frequently, even under the
Feres dispensation. If Johnson's helicopter had crashed into
a civilian's home, the homeowner could have brought an
FTCA suit that would have invaded the sanctity of military
decisionmaking no less than respondents'. If a soldier is injured not "incident to service," he can sue his Government regardless of whether the alleged negligence was military negligence. And if a soldier suffers service-connected injury
because of the negligence of a civilian (such as the manufacturer of an airplane), he can sue that civilian, even if the civilian claims contributory negligence and subpoenas the serviceman's colleagues to testify against him.
In sum, neither the three original Feres reasons nor the
post hoc rationalization of "military discipline" justifies our
failure to apply the FTCA as written. Feres was wrongly
decided and heartily deserves the "widespread, almost universal criticism" it has received. In re "Agent Orange"
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Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246
(EDNY), appeal dism'd, 745 F. 2d 161 (CA2 1984). *
II

The Feres Court claimed its decision was necessary to
make "the entire statutory system of remedies against the
Government . . . a workable, consistent and equitable
whole." 340 U. S., at 139. I am unable to find such beauty
in what we have wrought. Consider the following hypothetical (similar to one presented by Judge Weinstein in In re
"Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, supra, at
1252): A serviceman is told by his superior officer to deliver
some papers to the local United States Courthouse. As he
nears his destination, a wheel on his government vehicle
breaks, causing the vehicle to injure him, his daughter
(whose class happens to be touring the Courthouse that day)
and a United States marshal on duty. Under our case law
and federal statutes, the serviceman may not sue the Government (Feres); the guard may not sue the Government (because of the exclusivity provision of the Federal Employees'
*See, e. g., Sanchez v. United States, 813 F. 2d 593, (CA2 1987);
Bozeman v. United States, 780 F. 2d 198, 200 (CA2 1985); Hinkie v.
United States, 715 F. 2d 96, 97 (CA3 1983), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1023
(1984); Mondelli v. United States, 711 F. 2d 567, 569 (CA3 1983), cert. denied, 465 U. S. 1021 (1984); Scales v. United States, 685 F. 2d 970, 974
(CA5 1982),, cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1082 (1983); LaBash v. United States
Dept. of Army, 668 F. 2d 1153, 1156 (CAlO), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 1008
(1982); Monaco v. United States, 661 F. 2d 129, 132 (CA9 1981), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 989 (1982); Hunt v. United States, 204 U. S. App. D. C.
308, 317, 636 F. 2d 580, 589 (1980); Veillette v. United States, 615 F. 2d
505, 506 (CA9 1980); Parker v. United States, 611 F. 2d 1007, 1011 (CA5
1980); Peluso v. United States, 474 F. 2d 605, 606 (CA3), cert. denied, 414
U. S. 879 (1973); Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline, and the Weapons of War, 29 St. Louis U. L. J. 383 (1985); Hitch, The Federal Tort
Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 Rutgers L. Rev. 316 (1954); Rhodes,
The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F.L. Rev. 24 (Spring
1976); Note, 51 J. Air L. & Com. 1087 (1986); Note, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 391
(1984); Note, 77 Mich. L. Rev. 1099 (1979); Note, 43 St. John's L. Rev. 455
(1969).
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Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U. S. C. § 8116); the daughter
may not sue the Government for the loss of her father's
companionship (Feres), but may sue the Government for her
own injuries (FTCA). The serviceman and the guard may
sue the manufacturer of the vehicle, as may the daughter,
both for her own injuries and for the loss of her father's
companionship. The manufacturer may assert contributory
negligence as a defense in any of the suits. Moreover, the
manufacturer may implead the Government in the daughter's
suit (United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543 (1951))
and in the guard's suit (Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United
States, 460 U. S. 190 (1983)), even though the guard was
compensated under a statute that contains an exclusivity provision (FECA). But the manufacturer may not implead the
Government in the serviceman's suit (Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S. 666 (1977)), even
though the serviceman was compensated under a statute that
does not contain an exclusivity provision (VBA).
The point is not that all of these inconsistencies are attributable to Feres (though some of them assuredly are), but
merely that bringing harmony to the law has hardly been the
consequence of our ignoring what Congress wrote and imagining what it should have written. When confusion results
from our applying the unambiguous text of a statute, it is at
least a confusion validated by the free play of the democratic
process, rather than what we have here: unauthorized rationalization gone wrong. We realized seven years too late
that "[t]here is no justification for this Court to read exemptions into the Act beyond those provided by Congress. If
the Act is to be altered that is a function for the same body
that adopted it." Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U. S.,
at 320 (footnote omitted).
I cannot take comfort, as the Court does, ante, at 4-5, and
n. 6, from Congress' failure to amend the FTCA to overturn
Feres. The unlegislated desires of later Congresses with regard to one thread in the fabric of the Federal Tort Claims
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Act could hardly have any bearing upon the proper interpretation of the entire fabric of compromises that their predecessors enacted into law in 1946. And even if they could, intuiting those desires from congressional failure to act is an
uncertain enterprise which takes as its starting point disregard of the checks and balances in the constitutional scheme
of legislation designed to assure that not all desires of a majority of the Legislature find their way into law.
l]
We have not been asked by the respondents to overrule
Feres, and so need not resolve whether considerations of
stare decisis should induce us, despite the plain error of the
case, to leave bad enough alone. As the majority acknowledges, however, "all of the cases decided by this Court under
Feres have involved allegations of negligence on the part of
members of the military." Ante, at 5. I would not extend
Feres any further. I confess that the line between FTCA
suits alleging military negligence and those alleging civilian
negligence has nothing to recommend it except that it would
limit our clearly wrong decision in Feres and confine the unfairness and irration lity that decision has bred. But that, I
thinK, IS JUstification enou
-......
Had Lieutenant Commander Johnson been piloting a commercial helicopter when he crashed into the side of a mountain, his widow and children could have sued and recovered
for their loss. But because Johnson devoted his life to serving in his country's armed forces, the Court today limits his
family to a fraction of the recovery they might otherwise
have received. four Imposition of that sacrifice bore the legitimacy of having been prescribed by the people's elected
Representatives, it would (insofar as we are permitted to inquire into such things) be just. But it has not been, and it is
not. I respectfully dissent.

I
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JOHNSONR SALLY-POW
Justice Scalia argues that Feres "was clearly
wrong", post, at 12, and his dissent would reject four
decades of adherence to its doctrine.

Arguing

"unfairness" in this case, Justice Scalia assumes that had
respondent been "piloting a commercial helicopter" his
family would recover more in damages than it now may

l

recover under the benefit programs available for a
serviceman and his family (cite).

It hardly need be said

that predicting the outcome of any damage suit - both with
respect to liability and the amount of damages - is
hazardous, whereas veterans' benefits are guaranteed by
law.

But, if "fairness" were the issue, one could respond

to the dissent's assumption by noting that had the

2.

negligent instructions that led to Johnson's ·death been
given by another serviceman, the consequences - under the
dissent's view- would . be equally "unfair".

But apart

from assumption, the dissent's reasoning largely . ignores
the question that underlies the rationale of the Feres
doctrine:

whether the injury was "incident to service"?

After all,

respondent was a member of the Armed Services,

and was engaged in performing a Coast Guard mission.
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85-2039 United States v. Johnson
This case is here from the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit.
In Feres v. United States, decided in 1950,
this Court held that a member of the Armed Services/
killed or injured in an activity incident to that
service,j could not sue the government under the Federal
Tort Claims Act.
In this case, Lt. Commander Johnson was a
helicopter pilot with the Coast Guard.

While on a

Coast Guard rescue mission, Johnson was killed when his
helicopter crashed into a mountain.

It is conceded

that, in poor weather, flight controllers of the
Federal Aviation Administration,j a civilian agency ~ had
misdirected the helicopter.
Johnson's wife, after receiving the statutory
compensation, brought this suit under the Federal Tort
Claims Act~seeking additional compensation for her
husband's death.

The District Court, relying on the

Court's decision in Feres, dismissed her suit.
The Court of Appeals reversed.

It found that

the Feres doctrine should not apply where the

2.

negligence was by a civilian government employee~rather
than by another member of the military service.
For the reasons stated in an opinion filed
today, we reverse.

Since 1950, this Court consistently

has applied the Feres

doctrine~to bar suits based on

injuries incurred incident to military service.

It is

not denied that Johnson was on a Coast Guard rescue

missio~incident

to his service.

The widow has received the compensation
provided by Congress.

We find no reason to reject a

doctrine / consistently followed since 1950, / and that
Congress has not chosen to change.
We therefore reaffirm the holding in

Feres ~

that the government is ~t liable~under the Tort
Claims Act,j for injuries to service personnel ~hen the
injuries occur in the course of activity/ incident to
military duties.
Justice Scalia has filed a dissenting opinion 1
in which Justices Brennan, Marhsall and Stevens have
joined.
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No. 85-2039, United States v. Johnson
FIRST DRAFT
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court
This case presents the question whether the doctrine
established in Feres v. United States, 340

u.s.

135

(1950), bars an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act
on behalf of a serviceman killed during the course of an
activity incident to service where the complaint alleges
negligence on the part of civilian employees of the
federal government.
I

2.

Lieutenant Commander Horton Winfield Johnson was a
helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard,
stationed in Hawaii.

In the early morning of January 7,

1982, Johnson's Coast Guard station received a distress
call from a boat lost in the area.

lc/1./h 1::

., .

Johns~n . a~a several

.J

I{

W-6

Coast Guard members ~ dispatched to search for
J "
the vessel. Inclement weather rendered visibility po ~

~r

u

~o

Johnson requested radar assistance from the Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA), a civilian agency of the
federal government.

The FAA controllers assumed positive

radar control over the helicopter.

Shortly thereafter,

the helicopter crashed into the side of a mountain on the
island of Molokai.

All the crew members, including

Johnson, were killed in the crash.

~

v

3•

Respondent, Johnson's wife, applied for and received
veterans' benefits as a result of her husband's death.l

~~;I
she filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28

u.s.c.

§§1346, 2671-2680.

Her complaint sought

damages from the United States on the grounds that the FAA
controllers negligently caused her husband's death.
Government filed a motion to dismiss,

~~

The
because

A

Johnson was killed during the course of his military
duties, respondent could not recover damages from the
United States.

The District Court agreed and dismissed

the complaint, relying exclusively on Peres.

~

l~n~

received $35,690.66 in life insurance, a $3,000
death gratuity, and preaen~ receives approximately $868 per
month in dependency and compensatory benefits. Brief for the
United States 3, n. 1.
~~~~~~

~l;s~,

'1--

~ .L.v ~ J1c..A~.
~~

t~(,$

~~

~~--?

4.

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed
the holding of the District Court, finding that this
Court's decision in Feres did not bar suit.
1530, 1535 {1985).

749 F. 2d

The Court of Appeals undertook a

lengthy analysis of the evolution of the Feres doctrine.
It noted that although the Court in Feres articulated
numerous rationales for the doctrine,2 these had not all
been consistently mentioned in subsequent cases.

It

observed, however, that this Court had applied three of
the factors underlying the Feres decision in two recent
cases, Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,

u

.t.'

2The bases underlying the decision in F ( f were;
(J..l the 1 . , .,)
absence of parallel private liability;
) the anomal~yf L~
applying various state law rules of 1 iabil ity to service n who
have little control over their geographic location; {
the
"distinctively federal character" of the relationship between the
Federal Government and servicemen; and
the existence of the
no-fault system of veterans' benefit compe sation. 340 u.s., at
156-159.
(_

(1

\ 11)

5.

431

u.s.

(19S3).

666 (1977) and Chappell v. Wallace, 462

u.s.

296

The Court thus concluded that despite apparent

criticism of the Feres decision by lower courts and
commentators, "it nonetheless 'is beyond question that it
is the law.'"

749 F. 2d, 1535 (quoting Brown v. United

States, 739 F. 2d 362, 365 (CAS 19S4)

(quoting Laswell v.

Brown, 6S3 F. 2d 261, 2675 (CAS 19S2), cert. denied, 459

u.s.

1210
The court then

~oceeded

~
&o discuss 1\ the application of

the Feres doctrine to the facts of this case.

91-

~ rt

noted the conflicting standards advocated by the parties
as to when the Feres doctrine should apply.

Respondent

urged the court to "bite the bullet, so to speak, and
jettison those rationales for the Feres doctrine ••.
[other than] the effect maintenance of the suit would have

6.

on the military disciplinary structure."
1535.

749 F. 2d, at

Respondent argued that a claim "based solely on the

conduct of civilians performing a civil ian service," id.,
at 1536, does not implicate this concern.

The Government

contended that the Peres doctrine bars recovery from the
United States whenever a serviceman is injured in the
course of his military service, regardless of whether the
alleged tortfeasors are military or civilian employees of
the Federal Government.

~1-IY# ~
~ declined to adopt either of these positions

The
in full.

Instead, it identified what it termed "the

typical Peres factual paradigm -- an FTCA suit for
injuries or death allegedly caused by the negligence of a
serviceman or an employee of the armed forces."
153 7.

It found:

Id., at

7.

"[T] he teaching of Fe res and its progeny • • . is
that when the Feres factual paradigm is present,
the issue is whether the injury arose out of or
during the course of an activity incident to
service. See Feres, 340 u.s. at 146 •••. If,
however, the alleged tortfeasor is not a member
of the armed forces or a civilian employee
engaged in activities usually associated with
the armed forces, we conclude that a court
should consult the Peres doctrine rationales as
set forth in Stencel 'to determine to what
extent, if any, allowance of [the] claim would
circumvent the purposes of the [FTCA] as •••
construed by the [Supreme] Court.' Stencel, 431
u.s. at 670." Ibid.

The court then held that under its articulated
analysis the Feres doctrine did not bar suit in this case.

9-h

~t

found "absolutely no hint in the scant record

"

that the conduct of any alleged tortfeasor even
remotely connected to the military will be scrutinized if
this case proceeds to trial."

Id., at 1539.

It thus was

"unable to discern any sound reason for barring
[respondent's] suit under the Feres doctrine."

Ibid.

The

court acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

8.

Circuit, "in a case strikingly similar to this one, has
reached the opposite conclusion."

Ibid. (citing Uptegrove

v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (1979), cert. denied, 444

u.s.

1044 (1980)}.

In Uptegrove, the wife of a Navy

lieutenant killed while flying horne on an Air Force C-141
transport brought suit against the Government under the
FTCA alleging negligence on the part of three FAA air
traffic controllers.

The court in Uptegrove dismissed the

suit on the basis of Feres.3 The Court of Appeals in this

3The court in Uptegrove specifically addressed the argument
that "the FAA employees were civilian employees and that the
policy reasons for the Feres doctrine do not apply because there
is no threatened interference with military discipline." 600 F.
2d, at 1250. The court implicitly found that the suit did not
threaten to interfere with military discipline, but that the
absence of this factor did not render Feres inapplicable.
Instead, it found that the proper focus was on the decedent's
military status, not that of the tort feasor. The court
concluded that because "there is no material issue of fact that
[the decedent's] death arose out of activity incident to his
military service [, the] Feres doctrine bars the ••• FTCA
action." Id., at 1251. Uptegrove was decided before this
Court's decision in United States v. Shearer, 105 s. Ct. 3039
(1985) ~ ]Of course we do not approve the reasoning of Uptegrove
~
~(Footnote continued)

9.

case found that "Uptegrove was wrongly decided," 749 F.
2d, at 1539, and expressly declined to reach the same
result.
The Government filed a suggestion for rehearing en
bane,

~~~-the

Court of Appeals granted.

court reinstated the panel's opinion.

The en bane

It found this

Court's decision in United States v. Shearer, 473

u.s.

(1985) to be "most helpful" to its decision and to
"reinforc[e] the analysis set forth in the panel opinion."
779 F. 2d 1492, 1493 (1986).

The court noted that this

Court in Shearer placed "[s]pecial emphasis ••• upon
military discipline and whether or not the claim being

(Footnote 3 continued from previous page)
to the extent that it is inconsistent with our decision in
Shearer.

Jr- ,.,

10.

considered would require civilian courts to second-guess
military decisions."

Id., at 1493-1494.

The court

concluded:
"[T]he panel op1n1on has given proper
consideration to the Peres factors with
particular attention to whether or not the
claims asserted here will implicate civilian
courts in conflicts involving the military
structure or military decisions. The claims
presented are based solely upon the conduct of
civilian employees of the Federal Aviation
Administration (a civilian administration within
the Department of Transportation) who were not
in any way involved in military activities. The
fact that the decedent was a helicopter pilot
for the United States Coast Guard is not
sufficient, standing alone, to activate the
Peres preclusion." I d., at 1494.

Judge Johnson, joined by three other judges,
from the decision of the Court.

dissen~7<f ~

The dissent found "the

dictates of the Peres doctrine [to] exemp[t] the
government from suit where an injury to a serviceman is
'incident to service.'"

Ibid.

11.

"Johnson's injury was undoubtedly sustained incident to
service, so under current law our decision ought to be a
relatively straightforward affirmance."

Ibid.

The

dissent criticized the "Peres factual paradigm"
articulated by the court, noting that "cases in which a
serviceman was injured incident to service by a civilian
government employee are hardly novel" and that
"consistently, no court until now has allowed recovery
against the government in this sort of suit."
1495.4

I d., at

The dissent further observed that the facts of
c.~

~

~
ill)

r)

4The list of citati~ compiled by the dissent ~ is worth
repeating: Potts v. United States, 723 F. 2d 20 (CA6 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 9 59 ( 1984) (Navy corpsman injured when
struck by broken cable from hoist operated by civilians); warner
v. United States, 720 F. 2d 837 (CAS 1983) (off-duty Army
enlisted man injured on base when motorcycle collided with
shuttle bus driven by civilian government employee); Jaffee v.
United States, 663 F. 2d 1226 (CA3 1981) (en bane), cert. denied,
456 U.s. 97 2 ( 1982) (serviceman injured by radiation exposure
allegedly due in part to intentional tort of civilian Department
of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission employees); Lewis v.
United States, 663 F. 2d 889 (CA9 1981) (Marine Corps pilot
(Footnote continued)

12.

this case should fall within the "Peres factual paradigm",
if properly framed.

According to the dissent:

"[T]he

true Peres factual paradigm is a case in which injury to a

(Footnote 4 continued from previous page)
killed in crash allegedly due to negligence of government
maintenance employees); Carter v. Cheyenne, 649 F. 2d 827 (CAlO
1981) (Air Force captain killed in crash at city airport for
which city brought third-party claim against FAA controllers);
Woodside v. United States, 606 F. 2d 134 (CA6 1979), cert.
denied, 44S U.S. 904 (1980) (Air Force officer killed in crash of
plane allegedly due to negligence of civilian flight instructor
employed by military flight club); Uptegrove v. United States,
600 F. 2d 1248 (CA9 1979), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 1044 (1980)
(serviceman killed in crash of Air Force transport due to alleged
negligence of FAA air traffic controllers); watkins v. United
States, 462 F. Supp. 980, aff'd on opinion below, S87 F. 2d 279
(CAS 1979) (serviceman killed on base when motorcycle collided
with shuttle bus driven by civilian government employee); Hass
v. United States, Sl8 F. 2d 1S9 (CAS 197S) (suit by insuroror
serviceman injured through malpractice of Public Health Service
employees barred); Bankston v. United States, 480 F. 2d 49S (CAS
1973) (serviceman inJured through Public Health Service employee
malpractice); United States v. Lee, 400 F. 2d SS8 (CA9 1968)
(serviceman killed in crash of military aircraft allegedly due to
FAA air controller negligence); She!pard v. United States, 369
F. 2d 272 (CA3 1966), cert. denied, 86 U.S. 982 (1967)
(serviceman killed in crash of military aircraft allegedly due to
FAA air controller negligence) (companion case to Lee, supra);
Layne v. United States, 29S F. 2d 433 (CA7 1961), cert. denied,
368 u.s. 990 (1962) (National Guardsman killed on training flight
due to negligence of civilian air controllers); United States v.
Weiner, 33S F. 2d 379 (CA9 1964) cert. denied sub nom. United
Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 379 u.s. 9Sl (196~serviceman
injured in part due to CAA employee negligence).

13.

serviceman is caused by any government employee" and
"[t]his suit falls squarely within that paradigm."

Id.,

at 1497 (emphasis in original).
We granted certiorari, _u.s.
the Court of

~

Appeals' ~formulation

( 1986) , to review

of the Feres doctrine

and to resolve the conflict in the circuits on the issue.S
We now reverse.
II
This Court's delineation of the boundaries of the
Feres doctrine begins in a case decided before Feres
itself.

In Brooks v. United States, 337 u.s. 49 (1949),

Sin addition to the decisi n of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Uptegrove specifically acknowledged by the Court
of Appeals in this case, t e decision in this case conflicts in
principle with the decisions of the Courts of Appeals cited
supra, n. 4, and with a recent, unpublished decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Newell v. United States, No.
86-1114 (Sept. 15, 1986).

14.

the Court confronted the question "whether members of the
~

L'1Tzn-f-~

United States armed forces can recover under
injuries not incident to their service."

~t

....<.

Act for

I d., at 50.

In

Brooks, two brothers and their father were in an
automobile accident on a public highway caused by the
negligence of a civilian employee of the Army driving a
~1....~~~~~.. ~~~~

United States Army truck.

~

t!U-

~

One of the brothers was killed;

the other brother and the father were badly injured.
Court of Appeals denied recovery on behalf of the two

~~
The ~
~

"f.-

~

~
brothers on the grounds that as members of the armed
forces, they could not recover against the Government.
1
This Court1-d*'
reverse~11i~
inding that the FTCA permitted

~
The Court found

recovery.

the Government's fears of "dire

consequences" unfounded where a suit is based upon "an
accident which had nothing to do with the Brooks' army

15.

careers, [and] injuries not caused by their service, "
noting that "[w]ere the accident incident to the Brooks'
service, a wholly different case would be presented."
Id., at 52.
argument

Although it rejected the Government's

in ~

case, the Court indicated that "[t]he

Government's fears may have point in reflecting
congressional purpose to leave injuries incident to
service where they were, despite literal language and
other considerations to the contrary."

Id., at 53.

In Feres, the Court addressed the "'wholly different
case' reserved ••• in Brooks."

~~fconsidered
1

three cases

.

340

u.s., at

138.

i~ the~eres eee~n.

The
In

the first case, the claim was that Army officials
negligently quartered an serviceman in barracks known to
be unsafe.

The other two cases alleged negligence on the

16.

part of Army surgeons in treating servicemen.

The

question presented was "whether the Tort Claims act

7?

extends its remedy to one sustaining 'incident to service' '
what under other circumstances would be an actionable
wrong."

~.~:;z.,r h

Ibid.

Hc...t-~

noted "considerations persuasive

""
of liability," ibid., but nevertheless concluded that "the
Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act
for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out
---------

-

-

---

4

{§i)are in the course of activity incident to service."

~- ~
~~pR Hu:..t-

Id., at 146.

In two places in the Peres opinion, the Court

~ ~

'JlA; .,_f t.:/"

Lf-

~~··•tt.t.c..._l,L

suggested that the military status of the tortfeasor
be relevant to its decision.

ight~

First, the Court identified

"[t]he common fact underlying the three cases" as being
"that each claimant, while on active duty and not on

{_~: ~~
h f- tJ ~ b ~

~·~·

J-1.&._

furlough, sustained injury due to negligence of others in
the armed forces."

Id., at 138 (emphasis added).

~~--

t.

Second,

~.

t'X-4L

in discussing one of several grounds for the holding, the ~h
~

Court stated: "It would hardly be a rational plan of
providing for those disabled in service by others in

~ce

to leave them dependent upon geographic

considerations over which they have no control."
143 (emphasis added).

id., at

Nevertheless, the language of the

opinion, viewed as a whole, is broad:

"We know of no

American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover
for negligence, against either his superior officers or
the Government he is serving," id., at 141 (emphasis
added);

n I

To whatever extent state law may apply to

govern the relations between soldiers or others in the
armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal

18.

governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents
and consequences of the relation between persons in
service and the Government are fundamentally derived from
federal sources and governed by federal authority.'"

Id.,

at 143-144 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332
u.s. 301 (1947))

(emphasis added).

See id., at 142

(finding relevant "the status of both the wronged and the
wrongdoer")

(emphasis added).

It is this broad language

that consistently has been repreated in recent decisions
describing the Feres doctrine.6

Finally, the Court

distinguished Brooks, supra, as follows:

6see Chappell v. Wallace, 462 u.s. 296, 299 (1983) ("Congress
did not intend to subject the Government to ••• claims [for
injuries suffered by a soldier in service] by a member of the
Armed Forces") (emphasis added); Stencel Aero En ineerin Cor •
v. United States, 431 u.s. 666, 669 1977 (In Feres ••• the
Court held that an on-duty serviceman who is injured due to the
negligence of Government officials may not recover against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act") (emphasis
added); Dalehite v. United States, 346 u.s. 15, 31, n. 25 (1953)
(Footnote continued)

19.

"The injury to Brooks did not arise out of or in
the course of military duty •••• This Court
rejected the contention [that there should be no
liability under the FTCA], primarily because
Brooks' relationship while on leave was not
analogous to that of a soldier injured while
performing duties under orders." Id., at 146.

-h...t-

~~~
~7~~~,....
.

Decisions since Feres have refined the doctrine1 In
1\
United States v. Brown, 348

I~

u.s.

110 (1954) ,\the Court

~ ~---

o-1-~

lt.u- ~lA~

characterized Feres as "holding that the Tort Claims Act

~MA/~
~~~

~&.

does not cover 'injuries to servicemen where the

injuries ~~~~
"l

arise out of or are in the course of activity

Y....
service.'

340

u.s.,

at 146."

~;

Id., at 112.

1

~he court

observed that "[t]he peculiar and special relationship of
the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the

~I
t

~
~w--t-

,r.~
,~.,

4.\.

z...

~

t).JI

t.-1-- (~
Jv ~ ""

(Footnote 6 continued from previous page)
(characterizing the Feres cases as involving "injuries
allegedly caused by the negligence of employees of the United
States) (emphasis added) •

W\4-t-\
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maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme
results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims
Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent
acts committed in the course of military duty, led the
court to read that Act as excluding claim) of that
character."

Ibid.

The Court then held that Peres did not

bar a suit for negligence by a discharged veteran for
medical treatment received in a Veterans Administration
hospital, finding that the injury complained of "was not
incident to military service."

Ibid.

In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,
supra, the Court held that Peres bars a third-party
indemnity action against the United States based on art
injury incurred by a serviceman during the course of
military duty.

The Court identified three rationales

21.

underlying the Feres decision.

First, "the relationship

between the Government and members of its Armed Forces is
'"distinctively federal in character,'" [and] it would
make little sense to have the Government's liability to
members of the Armed Services dependent on the fortuity of
where the soldier happened to be stationed at the time of
the injury."

431

u.s.,

at 671.

Second, "the Veterans'

Benefits Act established, as a substitute for tort
liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation scheme
which provides generous pensions to injured servicemen,
without regard to any negligence attributable to the
.,.--

Government."

Ibid.

In fact, "the military compensation

scheme provides an upper limit of liability for the
Government as to service-connected injuries."

Ibid.

The

third factor is the "effects of the maintenance of such

22.

suits on discipline," articulated in United States v.
Brown, supra, at 112.

The Court found the three factors

equally applicable to a third-party indemnity suit brought
by a government contractor against the Government.
The Court's most recent statement respecting the Feres
doctrine is in United States v. Shearer, supra.

In that

case, the Court confirmed that "Feres seems best
explained" by the military discipline rationale.

105

Ct., at 3043 (quoting United States v. Muniz, 374

u.s.

150, 162 (1963}
112}}.

s.

(quoting United States v. Brown, supra, at

The Court found that a suit brought by the mother

of a serviceman who was killed by another serviceman while
the victim was off duty and off the military base.
mother alleged that the killer's superiors failed to
exercise sufficient control over him and negligently

The

23.

failed to warn others of the danger that he posed.

The

Court noted that "[t]he Feres doctrine cannot be reduced
to a few bright-line rules," ibid., and found that the
allegations of the complaint went "directly to the
'management' of the military ••• [,] call[ing] into
question basic choices about the discipline, supervision,
and control of a serviceman."

Ibid.

Although stating

that the other grounds for the Feres decision are "no
longer controlling," the Court noted that they were
present:

"It would be anomalous for the government's duty

to supervise servicemen to depend on the local law of
various states ••• and the record shows that Private
Shearer's dependents are entitled to statutory veterans'
benefits."

Id., at 3043, n. 4.

found that Feres barred the suit.

Accordingly, the Court

24.

III
A

Feres precludes suit under the FTCA for injuries that
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service."

340

u.s., at 146.

This Court has never

deviated from this characterization of the Feres bar.
Neither has Congress changed this standard in the more
than 35 years since it was articulated, although, as the
Court noted in Fe res, Congress "possesses a ready remedy"
to alter a misinterpretation of its intent.

Id., at 138.

Here, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed while
performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a primary
duty of the Coast Guard.

f;
'
oi ~
7The Coast GUard 1s a military
services . a-t

aH:--~-im es.

~

14

See 14

>

u.s.c. §§1, 2, 88(a) (1) .7
.......

service J an ~

u.s.c. §1.

~ 1-.ir:-.f

branch of the armed

25.

There is no dispute that Johnson's injury arose directly
out of the rescue mission,

~~-

~h

u
is clearly an activity
"\

,,"

incident to {!J. i sjmilitary servic:_.

According to the

standard as it has consistently been articulated, the
Peres doctrine

s~ould

s

bar suit in this case.

~~

Respondent argues that although the Court continues to
A

use the Peres terminology,
standard is no longer what
Respondent relies on

~')A-C.~
~r

~n

decisions indicate that the

its fac3 it appears to

~~~ ~~~ation

It

United States v. Shearer,

/2--.~

supr~,jlthat

b~
in

the effect of tort

suits on military discipline is the "best expla [nation]"
for the Peres doctrine.

105

s. Ct., at

3043.

According

to respondent, because this suit does not question the
actions of a fellow member of the military, it will not

26.

impair military discipline and thus the Feres bar should
not apply.
B

The contention that Feres bars only suits

0

/' dire~~~

t

~,

~hJ?

military personnel fails to recognize the
t/

scope of the impact on military discipline that Feres is
designed to prevent.

A distinction that relies on the

identity of the named defendant is too facile in this
context.

Any challenge based upon a service-related

injury necessarily threatens to call into question the

l

,

try

conduct of the military as well as the named defendant.
Questions as to the "hows" and "whys" of the military
mission are almost always intertwined with the
determination of liability on the part of the named
defendant.

Even if not named as defendants, members of

27.

the military must stand ready to defend their actions as
part of pretrial investigation and discovery into the
cause of the injury and the potential for contributory
negligence.

The "general costs" of "distraction of

officials from their governmental duties [and] inhibition
of discretionary action" occur when military personnel
must face the "risks of trial," as well as trial itself.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
(emphasis added).

u.s.

800, 816 (1982)

Consequently, respondent's

~igerett1r

assertions that her suit will not question command
decisions, even if accurate on the specific facts of this
case, are unavailing;

this is clearly the

"~

of suit

[in which] commanding officers would have to stand
prepared to convince a civilian court of the wisdom of a

28.

wide range of military and disciplinary decisions."
United States v. Shearer, supra, at 3044 (emphasis added).
Even assuming that no military judgments would be
challenged in this suit, the argument that questioning
civilian conduct does not implicate military discipline
concerns is in error.

Civilian employees of the federal

government often work closely with the military to
facilitate the performance of military activities.8

As

the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has noted in a
Feres doctrine case, "a civilian is analogous to a
serviceman when he is performing functions for the benefit

8rn fact, FAA flight controllers are an excellent example of
civilian personnel who work in concert with the military to
facilitate military functions. In general, the FAA and the
United States Armed Forces have a formal working relationship
that provides for FAA participation in military activities. See
FAA, u.s. Dept. of Transp., Order 7610.4F: Special Military
Operations (Jan. 21, 1981). Specifically in this case, the FAA
played an integral role in the military mission.

J,

~J' ~,

29.

of the military."

Hass ex. rel. United States v. United

States, 518 F. 2d 1138, 1142, n. 4 (1975).

The effective

performance of military functions demands that civilians
respond with the same unhesitating conduct required of
military personnel, and the threat of tort liability for
these civilians would have the same impact on the
discipline and effectiveness of military operations as if
military judgment were questioned directly.

Accordingly,

application of the Feres doctrine is appropriate.
Most importantly, a focus on "military discipline" as
being threatened only when command or strategic judgments
of military officers are implicated is too narrow.

This

Court's recent statement that the scope of the Feres
doctrine includes a challenge to "a decision of command"
did not imply that this is the limit of the doctrine's

30.

application.

United States v. Shearer, supra, at 3044.

Read in context, this passage in Shearer indicates that
Peres bars all "types of claims that, if generally
permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive
military affairs at the expense of military discipline and
effectiveness."

Ibid. (emphasis omitted).

These types of

claims necessarily range from a challenge to a judgment
respecting the control and discipline of an individual
serviceman to a challenge to "the wisdom of broad military
policy."

Ibid.

In fact, the decision in Peres itself

indicates that the doctrine is not limited in application
to suits that will necessarily question command decisions
of superior officers.

Whereas one of the cases under

review involved the judgment by military officials to
house servicemen in certain barracks, the other two

31.

involved claims of medical malpractice against Army
surgeons.

Ostensibly, the malpractice suits would not

have implicated military discipline in the strict sense of
"a heirarchical structure of discipline and obedience to
command."

Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 300.

Nevertheless, this Court found that the suits were barred
because the servicemen sought to recover damages from the
Government for injuries incurred in the course of their
military duties.
Feres and its progeny indicate that inquiry into
injuries "incident to service" necessarily implicates the
fundamental military discipline rationale of the doctrine,

32.

when the concept is properly framed.9

This concept is not

limited to "instinctive obedience" to specific orders.
Goldman v. Weinberger, 106

s. Ct. 1310, 1313 (1986).

Instead, "military discipline" also embodies "unity,
commitment, and esprit de corps."

Ibid.

In every respect

the military is, as this Court has often recognized, "a
specialized society separate from civilian society."
Parker v. Levy, 417

u.s.

733 (1974).

See Orloff v.

9Respondent relies on this Court's recent decision in United
States v. Shearer, supra, to argue that we have eschewed "brightline rules" such as the one that we affirm today: that all claims
by servicemen against the Government for injuries incurred
"incident to service" are barred. 105 s. Ct., at 3043. But
respondent reads this remark in Shearer out of context. That
case is properly read to hold that the question whether a
particular injury is "incident to service" is not dispositive
where strong military discipline concerns indicate that suit
nevertheless should not proceed. Although the "incident to
service" test can be expected to encompass most suits that
present a threat to military discipline, Shearer indicates that
even where the injury is not service-related, suit may be barred
if it would "requir[e] the civilian court to second-guess
military decisions" or "impair essential military discipline."
Ibid.
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Willoughby, 345

u.s. 83, 94 {1953).

Thus, even where

protections are constitutional, "[t]he rights of military
men must yield somewhat '"to meet certain overriding
demands of discipline and duty."'"

Brown v. Glines, 444

u.s. 348, 354 {1980) {quoting Parker v. Levy, supra, at
758)

{quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346

u.s. 137, 140 {1953)

{plurality opinion)) ) •
Tort suits brought on behalf of servicemen against the
Government threaten military discipline in that they
undermine the fundamental commitment of serviceman to
Sovereign.

Serviceman status brings with it the prestige

of membership as well as the numerous benefits unique to
military service.lO

At the same time, it is no secret

lOThe library is compiling a list of the special benefits for
this note.

3 4.

that military service entails "[s] ignificant risks of
accidents and injuries."

Stencel Aero Engineering Corp.

v. United States, supra, at 672.

In fact, a large measure

of the prestige inherent in military service stems from
the willingness of servicemen to undertake these risks in
order to serve their country.

Permitting suits by

servicemen against the country they serve for servicerelated injuries

(

ould undermine the commitment essential

to effective service.

Military discipline involves not

only loyalty to one's direct superiors, but loyalty to th
Nation as a whole as the conduct of its officials impacts
/

upon duties incident to military service.

l)t

}~~ /'

Thus, the
.J.~

military discipline rationale that forms the basis for the
0
Feres doctrine properly applies to all suits against the
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Government on behalf of servicemen based on injuries
incurred incident to service.
c

In addition to the impact of suits brought for
injuries incurred "incident to service" on military
discipline, the other factors that contributed to the
decision in Peres support the decision in this case.ll
First, Johnson and the FAA flight controllers, both being

~ ., k-~1n
llRespondent puts great ,weight on our recent observation that
these additional factors are "no longer \controlling." United
States v. Shearer, supra, at 3043, n. 4. But these factors-the availability of stptutory veterans ~ benefits and the anomaly
of applying local lawjbetween a service an and the Government he
is serving -- could not be controlling 9therwise almost any suit
brought by a serviceman against the Gove [ nment would be barred
regardless of whether it occurred incident to service or whether
military discipline concerns were implicated. Instead, these
factors have special weight in the context in which they were
articulated. First, where an injury is "incident to service," it
is the particular type of injury that the statutory benefits were
created to compensate. It is also the type of injury that
servicemen could anticipate as part of their military service.
Thus, it makes sense that servicemen would be limited to the
statutory recovery for service-related injuries. Second, when a
serviceman is injured "incident to service," his injury is
directly tied to his "distinctively federal relationship" with
{Footnote continued)

lo
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employees of the Federal Government performing
specifically federal duties, were in a relationship
"distinctively federal in character."

340

u.s.,

at 143.

It would make little sense for the Government's liability
to one of its employees on behalf of another to depend on
the vagaries of state law.

Also, respondent received full

veterans' benefits for her husband's death.

These

benefits are generous, and, as we have previously
observed, properly "provid[e] an upper limit of liability
for the Government as to service-connected injuries."
Stencel v. Aero Engineering Corp., supra, at 673.
Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444

u.s.

See

460, 464

(Footnote 11 continued from previous page)
the Government he is serving. Thus, applying local law to this
relationship would be particularly anomalous.

37.

{1980) {"[T]he Veterans' Benefits Act provided
compensation to injured servicemen, which we understood
Congress intended to be the sole remedy for serviceconnected injuries").
IV
We reaffirm the holding of Peres that "the Government
is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or
are in the course of activity incident to service."

u.s.,

at 146.

340

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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The most recent decision of this Court involving
the Peres doctrine is United States v. Shearer, supra.
The case involved a suit by the mother of a serviceman who
was killed by another serviceman while the victim was off
duty and off the military base.

The mother alleged that

the killer's superiors failed to exercise sufficient
control over him, and negligently failed to warn others of
the danger that he imposed.

Although the Court stated

that "Peres seems best explained by the military
discipline rationale, 105 s.ct., at 3043 (quoting United
States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963) (quoting United
States v. Brown, supra, at 112)), the Court stated that
"[t]he Peres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-

2.

line rules".

Id.

On the basis of the allegations of the

complaint, the Court stated that these went "directly to
the 'management' of the military • • • [,] call[ing] into
question basic choices about discipline, supervision and
control of a serviceman."

Although stating that the other

grounds for the Feres decision are "no longer
controlling", the opinion of Chief Justice Burger noted
that they were present, and were relied upon:

"It would

anomalous for the government's duty to supervise
servicemen to depend on the local law of various states •
and the record shows that Private Shearer's dependents
are entitled to statutory veterans' benefits."

~o.

8S-2o3Pi

)

u.s.

v. jolwt-s;VA-

~ ...
n,_._~
,__f~

III

1-v-1~~

~·

LL~~U--Feres precludes suit under the FTCA for injuries that

~~~LJ...

uarise out of or are in the course of activity incident to

~~

service.~

340

u.s.,

at 146.

This Court has never

deviated from this characterization of the Feres bar.
Neither has Congress changed this standard in the more
than 35 years since it was articulated, although, as the
Court noted in Fe res, Congress 'jpossesses a ready remedy 11
to alter a misinterpretation of its intent.

Id., at 138.5

Respondent finds significance in the fact that the
tortfeasors in Feres were members of the military.

Scongress has recently considered, but not enacted,
legislation that would allow service members to bring medical
malpractice suits against the Government. See H.R. 1161, 99th
Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985); H. R. 1942, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983) •

But

24.

doctrine apply with equal force to a case, such as this
one, where negligence on the part of a civilian government
employee is alleged.?

The Feres doctrine has consistently

been understood to bar suit on behalf of service members
against the Government based upon service-related
injuries.

we decline to modify the doctrine at this late

date.

(Footnote 6 continued from previous page)
allegedly caused by the negligence of employees of the United
States) (emphasis added).
~
?Respondent puts great weight on our recent observation that
factors other than the effect f a suit on military discipline
are "no longer controlling.~
nited States v. Shearer, supra, at
3043, n. 4. But these factors -- the availability of statutory
veterans' benefits and the anomaly of applying local law between
a serviceman and the Government he is serving -- could not be
controlling, otherwise almost any suit brought by a serviceman
against the Government would be barred regardless of whether the
underlying injury occurred incident to service or whether the
suit implicated military discipline concerns.
Instead, these
factors have special weight in the context in which they were
articulated -- where a serviceman seeks to sue the Government for
an injury incurred in the course of an activity incident to
service.

25.

A
~The

relationship between the Government and members

of its armed forces is 'distinctively federal in
character.'~

Feres, supra, at 143 (quoting United States

v. Standard Oil, supra, at 301).

This federal

relationship is implicated to the greatest degree when the
service member is performing activities incident to his
federal service.
entails

Performance of the military function

~'[s]ignificant

risks of accidents and injuries,u

Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at
672, in diverse parts of the country and the world.

Where

a service member is injured incident to service -- that
is, because of his military relationship with the
Government -- it

~makes

no sense to permit the fortuity of

the situs of the alleged negligence to affect the
liability of the Government to [the] serviceman.u

Ibid.

26.

Instead, application of the underlying federal remedy that
provides Hsimple, certain, and uniform compensation for
injuries or death of those in armed

services,~

Feres,

supra, at 144, is appropriate.
The existence of these generous statutory disability
and death benefits is an independent reason why the Feres
doctrine bars suit for service-related injuries.8

In

Feres, the Court observed that the Hprimary purpose" of
the FTCA
without;

11

was to extend a remedy to those who had been
if it incidentally benefited those already well

provided for, it appears to have been unintentional.

11

Bservice members receive numerous other benefits unique to
their service status. For example, members of the military and
their dependents are eligible for educational benefits, extensive
health benefits, home-buying loan benefits, space available
travel on overseas flights, and retirement benefits after a
minimum of 20 years of service. See generally Uniformed Services
Almanac ( 1985) •

/''
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27.

u.s.,

at 140.

Those injured during the course of activity

incident to service not only receive benefits that
"compare favorably with those provided by most workmen's
compensation statutes, .. id., at 145, but their recovery is
11

swift [and] efficient," Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.

United States, supra, at 673, "normally requir[ing] no
litigation ...

Feres, supra, at 145.

The Court in Feres

found it difficult to believe that Congress would have
provided such a comprehensive system of benefits while at
the same time contemplating recovery for service-related
injuries under the FTCA.

Particularly persuasive was the

fact that Congress 'jomi tted any provision to adjust these
two types of remedy to each other."

340

u.s.,

at 144.

Congress still has not amended the veteran's benefits
statute or the FTCA to make any such provision for

28.

injuries incurred during the course of activity incident
to service, even though it has made such a provision for
veterans who receive FTCA awards after they have been
discharged from service.

See 38

Brooks v. United States, supra.

u.s.c.

§351.

See also

We thus find no reason to

modify what we have previously found to be the law: the
statutory military benefits

~provid[e]

an upper limit of

liability for the Government as to service-connected
injuries."

Stencel v. Aero Engineering Corp. v. United

States, supra, at 673.
States, 444

u.s.

See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United

460, 464 (1980)

("[T]he Veterans'

Benefits Act provided compensation to injured servicemen,
which we understood Congress intended to be the sole
remedy for service-connected injuries").

29.

Suits brought by service members against the

aks:;
Government for injuries incurred incident to service 1are
~

11

barred by the Feres doctrine because they are the

types of claims that, if generally permitted, would

involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the
expense of military discipline and effectiveness ...
States v. Shearer, supra, at 3043.

United

In every respect the

military is, as this Court has recognized, "a specialized
society separate from civilian
417

u.s.

u.s.

733L 743 (1974);

83, 94 (1953).

society.~~

Parker v. Levy,

See Orloff v. Willoughby, 345

"[T]o accomplish its mission the

military must foster instinctive obedience, unity,
commitment, and esprit de
106

s. Ct.

corps.~·

1310, 1313 (1986).

Goldman v. Weinberger,

Military discipline

involves not only obedience to orders, but in a broader

30.

sense involves duty and loyalty to one's service and to
one's country.

Suits brought by service members against

the Government for service-related injuries have the
potential to disrupt this essential military discipline in

rL-

br-o--~1-sense of the word.

~

Aeeotdingl:y, the Feres

cloct ~

B

In this case, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed
while performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a
primary duty of the Coast Guard.
88(a) (1) .9

See 14

u.s.c.

§§1, 2,

There is no dispute that Johnson's injury

arose directly out of the rescue mission, that is clearly
an activity incident to his military service.

Johnson

9The Coast Guard, of course, is a military service, and an
important branch of the armed services. 14 u.s.c. §1.

31.

went on the rescue mission specifically because of his
military status.

His wife received and is continuing to

receive statutory benefits on account of his death.

And

the potential that a suit in this case would disrupt
military discipline is substantial; Johnson was acting

. - . LiJl ,
~

~~

~.A.-Pl.- P-p-~ ,..... e_ J.... .,. 1

}14 ..-< t.

.A~~ o« '<-' tr'f ~ c.o--..,..j-

under~ d~, and the civilian officials named in

~~

the complaint were

~or·:~~~

~~~

. this case thus fall

mission.lO

~k~r

~ ~~~ ~

withi

doctrine as it consistently

he heart of

{/fv-~

~~·

~-~~

~

~

has been articulated.
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lOThe FAA and the United States Armed Forces have a formal ~·
working relationship that provides for FAA participation in
·-~ ~
military activities. See FAA, u.s. Dept. of Transp., Order
~~~ ~~-~
7610.4F: Special Military Operations (Jan. 21, 1981).
~-'
Specifically in this case, the FAA played an integral role in ~he ~ .• ~
military mission.
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IV

we reaffirm the holding of Feres that uthe Government
is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or
are in the course of activity incident to service.
U.S., at 146.

11

340

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

23.

longer controlling", the opinion of Chief Justice Burger
noted that they were present, and were relied upon:

"It

would anomalous for the government's duty to supervise
servicemen to depend on the local law of various states
•• and the record shows that Private Shearer's dependents
are entitled to statutory veterans' benefits."
3043, n. 4.

Id., at

For all of these reasons, the Court found

that Feres barred the suit.
III
A

Feres precludes suit under the FTCA for injuries that
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service."

340

u.s., at 146.

This Court has never

deviated from this characterization of the Feres bar.
Neither has Congress changed this standard in the more

24.

as the
Court noted in Peres, Congress "possesses a ready remedy"
to alter a misinterpretation of its intent.

Id., at 138.6

Here, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed while

I
{
I

performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a primary

~
\

duty of the Coast Guard.

See 14 u.s.c. §§1, 2, 88(a) (1) .7

There is no dispute that Johnson's injury arose directly
out of the rescue mission, that is clearly an activity
incident to his military service.

According to the

standard as it has consistently been articulated, the
Peres doctrine bars suit in this case.

))

6congress has recently considered, but not enacted,
legislation that would allow service members to bring medical
malpractice suits against the Government. See H.R. 1161, 99th
Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985); H.R. 1942, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983).
7The Coast Guard, of course, is a military service, and an
important branch of the armed services. 14 u.s.c. §1.

'

\
\\

I

25.

Respon ent nevertheless argues that although the Court
continues

use the Feres terminology, more recent
standard is no longer what it

appears to be o

Feres, especially

its face.

Respondent relies on selected

nited States v. Shearer, supra, stating

the "best expla[natio

" for the Feres doctrine.8

Respondent argues that

effect of a particular suit on

military discipline is

the only relevant consideration

under Feres.

Respondent t en contends that the Feres

doctrine should not bar her suit because her suit alleges

8
S~e
United States v. Shearer, 105 S. Ct. 3039, 3043
(1985); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 u.s. 2 6, 300 (1983); United
States v. Muniz, 374 u.s. 150, 159 (1963); United States v.
Brown, 348 u.s. 110, 112 ( 1954).

26.

negligence on t e part of a civilian employee of the
nt, as opposed to a member of the
military, and therefore cannot implicate this concern of
Feres.

We disa J ee with respondent's proposed

modification of the Feres doctrine and with her
application of the doctrine to this case.
I

\

B

I

I

The holding of the Court in Fe res was that "the
Government is not iiable under the Federal Tort Claims Act
for injuries to

icemen where the injuries arise out of

I

or are in the course of activity incident to service."
340

u.s.,

at 146.

Fe res were members

Although the alleged tortfeasors in
o~

the military,

~ ~~-.1..,~ ~A
.do ~gt find -'\that

~w.e

/'4A- ,{,-~ ~ dcL_, fact to have been\ matilrral t~ tit-e decision.

q___
£7 ..

~

Nor do we

find that this Court's later descriptions of the doctrine

27.

in any way have 1 'mited its applicability to a suit based
upon a service-r

ated injury.

Instead, we

~

~that

for

all of the reaso/ s that underlie the Peres doctrine,9 when
a service membe .r sues the Government for an injury that

I

~

9Respondent puts great weight on ~ recent observation that
factors other than the effect of a suit on military discipline
are "no longer controlling." United States v. Shearer, supra, at
3043, n. 4. But these factors -- the availabil1ty of statutory
veterans' benefits and the anomaly of applying local law between
a serviceman and the Government he is serving -- could not be
controlling, otherwise almost any suit brought by a serviceman
against the Government would be barred regardless of whether the
underlying injury occurred incident to service or whether the
suit implicated military discipline concerns.
Instead, these
factors have special weight in the context in which they were
articulated -- where a serviceman seeks to sue the Government for
an injury incurred in the course of an activity incident to
service.
espondent also argues that the decision in Shearer eschewed
"brigfi
ine rules" such as the one that we affirm today: that
all claims
servicemen against the Government for injuries
incurred "incr nt to service" are barred. 105 s. Ct., at 3043.
But respondent re G~ this remark in Shearer out of context. That
case is properly reaa 0 hold that the question whether a
particular injury is "incident to service" is not dispositive
where strong military discipline concerns indicate that suit
nevertheless should not proceed. Although the "incident to
service" test can be expected to encompass most suits that
present a threat to military discipline, Shearer indicates that
even where the injury is not service-related, suit may be barred
if it would "requir[e] the civilian court to second-guess
military decisions" or "impair essential military discipline."
Ibid.

1

28.

arises out o
continues

activity incident to service,

~ the

doctrine

o bar suit.

"The relationship between the Government and members
of its armed forces is 'distinctively federal in
character.'"

Peres, supra, at 143 (quoting United States

v. Standard Oil, supra, at 301).

This federal

relationship is implicated to the greatest degree when the
service member is performing activities incident to his
federal service.

It is

~~'\ ~military

service

entails "[s]ignificant risks of accidents and injuries."
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at
672.

~ i.- .?-- ~ u-_r-~
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w o dec1 es

to enter the Armed Forces and that a service
fairly expect will be compensated exclusively by the

v

29.

£N£..~~
comprehensive system of military disability benefits
~

1\

~ 14.

J

I
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service-re
disregard

be particularly anomalous to
he essentially federal nature of the underlying
'to have the Government's 1 iabil ity to members
dependent on the fortuity of where the
stationed at the time of the

!E·, at 671.~·---------------The existence of )\ ...Qempr el'l-efis :k::s sySt em
~y

benefits

r

$

provid~

"simple, certain, and

uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in
armed services :

~

~s

an independent reason why the Peres

f,v

U' ..

l

doctrine bars suit in this - ease.

4

r(

;v t • r _,
Peres, supra, at 144.

In Peres, the Court observed that the "primary purpose" of

30.

the FTCA "was to extend a remedy to those who had been
without;

if it incidentally benefited those already well

provided for, it appears to have been unintentional."
u.s., at 140.

320

Those injured during the course of activity

incident to service not only receive benefits that
"compare favorably with those provided by most workmen's
compensation statutes," id., at 145, but their recovery is
"swift [and] efficient," Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States, supra, at 673, "normally requir[ing] no
litigation."

Feres, supra, at 145 , lP

The Court in Feres

found it difficult to believe that Congress would have
provided such a comprehensive system of benefits while at

lOservice members receive numerous other benefits unique to
their service status. For example, members of the military and
their dependents are eligible for educational benefits, extensive
health benefits, home-buying loan benefits, space available
travel on overseas flights, and retirement benefits after a
minimum of 20 years of service. See generally Uniformed Services
Almanac ( 1985) •

31.

the same time contemplating recovery for service-related
injuries under the FTCA.

Particularly persuasive was the

fact that Congress "omit ted any provision to adjust these
two types of remedy to each other. "

340

u.s.,

at 144.

Congress still has not amended the veteran's benefits
statute or the FTCA to make any such provision for
injuries incurred during the course of activity incident
to service, even though it has made such a provision for
veterans who receive FTCA awards after they have been
discharged from service.

See 38

Brooks v. United States, supra.

u.s.c.

§351.

See also

We thus find no reason to

modify what we have previously found to be the law: the
statutory military benefits "provid[e] an upper limit of
liability for the Government as to service-connected
injuries."

Stencel v. Aero Engineering Corp. v. United

32.

States, supra, at 673.
States, 444

See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United

u.s. 460, 464 (1980) ("[T]he Veterans'

Benefits Act provided compensation to injured servicemen,
which we understood Congress intended to be the sole
remedy for service-connected injuries").
The "best expla[nation]", United States v. Shearer,
supra, at 3043, for the Feres doctrine-- the effect of a
tort suit on military discipline

is also fully

applicable to any suit brought on behalf of a service
member against the Government for an injury incurred in
the course of an activity incident to military service.
The fact that a suit alleges negligence on the part of a
civilian employee of the federal government does not make
the military discipline rationale inapplicable.

Any

challenge based upon a service-related injury necessarily

33.

threatens to call into question the conduct of the
military as well as that of the alleged tortfeasor.
Questions as to the "hows" and "whys" of the military
mission are almost always intertwined with the
determination of liability on the part of the alleged

~

tortfeasor.

Even if not named as defendants, members of

the military must stand ready to defend their actions as
part of pretrial investigation and discovery into the
cause of the injury and the potential for contributory
negligence.ll

Moreover, a challenge to civilian conduct

alone often can impact adversely on military discipline.
Civilian employees of the federal government frequently

om their
ction"
"risks of t 'al "
'-~~~e~
r~a~l~d, 457 u.s. 800,

34.

work closely with the military to facilitate the
performance of military activities.l2

As the Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has noted in a Feres
doctrine case, "a civilian is analogous to a serviceman
when he is performing functions for the benefit of the
military."

Hass ex. rel. United States v. United States,

518 F. 2d 1138, 1142, n. 4 {1975).

The effective

erformance of military functions demands that civilians
respond with the same unhesitating conduct required of
military personnel, and the threat of tort liability for
these civilians would have the same impact on the

~~ ct, FAA flight controlle
re a
c· ilian personnel who work in concert wir~~~~~~~~~-cil 'tate military functions. In enera . 1the FAA and the
~
United Sta es Arme Forces have a formal working relationship
~that provides for FAA participation in military activities. See
FAA, u.s. Dept. of Transp., Order 7610.4F: Special Military
Operations {Jan. 21, 1981). Specifically in this case, the FAA
played an integral role in the military mission.

35.

discipline and effectiveness of military operations as if

\
military judgment were questioned directly.

discipline" is broad, encompassing the need not only for
"instinctive obedience" to specific orders, Goldman v.
Weinberger, 106

s.

Ct. 1310, 1313 (1986), but also for

"unity, commitment, and esprit de corps."

Ibid.

service members against the
serve for
commitment

~
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36.

service.l3 Feres bars

all~pes
__..

- ..

)

of claims that, if

permitted, would involve the judiciary in
sensitive military affairs at the expense of military
discipline and effectiveness."

United States v. Shea

~----'-'~.;;...~"17'\

?

Thus, the military discipline ratio
that forms the basis for the Feres doctrine properly
applies to all suits against the Government on behalf of
service members based on injuries arising out of act' ity
incident to service.
IV

)
i

l3Jn fact, the decision in Feres itself indicates that the
doctrine is not limited in appl1cation to suits that will
necessarily question command decisions of superior officers.
Whereas one of the cases under review involved the judgment by ~
military officials to house servicemen in certain barracks, the ~
other two involved claims of medical malpractice against Army 1 _ ,
surgeons. Ostensibly, the malpractice suits would not have
~
implicated military discipline in the strict sense of "a
~
heirarchical structure of discipline and obedience to command." ~
Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 300. Nevertheless, this Court
found that the suits were barred because the servicemen sought to h ~
recover damages from the Government for injuries incurred in the _ ~ e
course of their military duties.
.1_
t~~

37.

We reaffirm the holding of Peres that "the Government
is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or
are in the course of activity incident to service."

U.s. , at 146.
Court of

340

ccordingly, we reverse the judgment of the
or the Eleventh Circuit and remand for

proceedings consi tent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 85-2039
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. FRIEDA JOYCE
JOHNSON, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF HORTON WINFIELD JOHNSON, DECEASED,
ETC., ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
[March - , 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court
This case presents the question whether the doctrine established in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950), bars
an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of a
service member killed during the course of an activity incident to service, where the complaint alleges negligence on
the part of civilian employees of the Federal Government.

I
Lieutenant Commander Horton Winfield Johnson was a
helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard, stationed
in Hawaii. In the early morning of January 7, 1982, Johnson's Coast Guard station received a distress call from a boat
lost in the area. Johnson and a crew of several other Coast
Guard members were dispatched to search for the vessel.
Inclement weather decreased the visibility, and so Johnson
requested radar assistance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a civilian agency of the Federal Government. The FAA controllers assumed positive radar control
over the helicopter. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter
crashed into the side of a mountain on the island of Molokai.
All the crew members, including Johnson, were killed in the
crash.

85-2039-0PINION
2

UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON

Respondent, Johnson's wife, applied for and received vet- ·
erans' benefits as a result of her husband's death.' In addition, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680. Her complaint
sought damages from the United States on the ground that
the FAA controllers negligently caused her husband's death.
The Government filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that because Johnson was killed during the course of his military duties, respondent could not r~cover damages from the United
States. The District Court agreed and dismissed the complaint, relying exclusively on this Court's decision in Feres.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
749 F . 2d 1530 (1985). It noted the language of Feres that
precludes suits by service members against the Government
for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. The court found ,
however, that the evolution of the doctrine since the Feres
decision warranted a qualification of the original holding according to the status of the alleged tortfeasor. The court
identified what it termed "the typical Feres factual paradigm" that is present when a service member alleges negligence on the part of another member of the military. 749 F .
2d, at 1537. "[W]hen the Feres factual paradigm is present,
the issue is whether the injury arose out of or during the
course of an activity incident to service." Ibid. But when
negligence is alleged on the part of a federal government employee who is not a member of the military, the court found
that the propriety of a suit should be determined by examin'Respondent has received $35,690.66 in life insurance, a $3,000 death
gratuity, and receives approximately $868 per month in dependency and
compensatory benefits. Brief for the United States 3, n. 1. The dependency and compensatory benefits normally are payable for the life of the
surviving spouse and include an extra monthly sum for any surviving child
of the veteran below age 18. See 38 U. S. C. §§ 411 (1982 ed., Supp. III);
38 CFR §§ 3.500, 3.502.
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ing the rationales that underlie the Feres doctrine. Although it noted that this Court has articulated numerous rationales for the doctrine, 2 it found the effect of a suit on
military discipline to be the doctrine's primary justification.
Applying its new analysis to the facts of this case, the court
found "absolutely no hint . . . that the conduct of any alleged
tortfeasor even remotely connected with the military will be
scrutinized if this case proceeds to trial." I d., at 1539. Accordingly, it found that Feres did not bar respondent's suit.
The court acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, "in a case strikingly similar to this one, has
reached the opposite conclusion." Ibid. (citing Uptegrove
v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (1979), cert. denied, 444
U. S. 1044 (1980)). 3 It concluded, however, that "Uptegrove
was wrongly decided," ibid., and declined to reach the same
result.
The Court of Appe;:t.ls granted the Government's suggestion for rehearing en bane. The en bane court found that this
Court's recent decision in United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S.
2

We have identified three factors that underlie the Feres doctrine:
"First, the relationship between the Government and members of its
Armed Forces is "'distinctively federal in character,'"; it would make little
sense to have the Government's liability to members of the Armed Services
dependent on the fortuity of where the soldier happened to be stationed at
the time of the injury. Second, the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes, as
a substitute for tort liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation scheme
which provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to
any negligence attributable to the Government. A third factor . . . [is]
'[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military
duty . ... "' Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S.
666, 671-672 (1977) (citations omitted).
3
In Uptegrove, the wife of a Navy lieutenant killed while flying home on
an Air Force C-141 transport brought suit against the Government under
the FTCA, alleging negligence on the part of three FAA air traffic controllers. The court in Uptegrove dismissed the suit on the basis of Feres.
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52 (1985) "reinforc[ed] the analysis -set forth in the panel opinion," 779 F. 2d 1492, 1493 (1986) (per curiam), particularly
the "[s]pecial emphasis . . . upon military discipline and
whether or not the claim being considered would require civilian courts to second -guess military decisions," id., at
1493-1494. It concluded that the panel properly had evaluated the claim under Feres and therefore reinstated the panel
op1mon. Judge Johnson, joined by three other judges,
strongly dissented. The dissent rejected the "Feres factual
paradigm" as identified by the court, finding that because
"Johnson's injury was undoubtedly sustained incident to
service, ... under current law our decision ought to be a relatively straightforward affirmance." I d., at 1494.
We granted certiorari, - - U. S. - - (1986), to review
the Court of Appeals' reformulation of the Feres doctrine and
to resolve the conflict among the circuits on the issue. 4 We
now reverse.
II
In Feres, this Court held that service members cannot
bring tort suits against the Government for injuries that
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. This Court has never deviated
from this characterization of the Feres bar. 5 Nor has Congress changed this standard in the more than 35 years since it
was articulated, even though, as the Court noted in Feres,
Congress "possesses a ready remedy" to alter a misinterpre'In addition to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Uptegrove, specifically acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in this
case, the decision conflicts in principle with the decisions of the Courts of
Appeals cited infra, n. 8.
5
See United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112 (1954); United States
v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 159 (1963); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States, supra, at 671; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 299
(1983); United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 52, 57 (1985).
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tation of its intent. I d., at 138. 6 Although ali of the cases
decided by this Court under Feres have involved allegations
of negligence on the part of members of the military, this
Court has never suggested that the military status of the alleged tortfeasor is crucial to the application of the doctrine. 7
6
Congress has recently considered, but not enacted, legislation that
would allow service members to bring medical malpractice suits against the
Government. See H. R. 1161, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985); H. R. 1942,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
7
In two places in the Feres opinion, the Court suggested that the military status of the tortfeasor might be relevant to its decision.· First, the
Court identified "[t]he common fact underlying the three cases" as being
"that each claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained
injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces." !d., at 138 (emphasis added). Second, in discussing one of several grounds for the holding, the Court stated: "It would hardly be a rational plan of providing for
those disabled in service by others in servi~e to leave them dependent upon
geographic considerations over which they have no control." Id., at 143
(emphasis added). Nevertheless, the language of the opinion, viewed as a
whole, is broad: "We know of no American law which ever has permitted a
soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers or the
Government he is serving," id., at 141 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted);
"' . . . To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the relations
between soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons outside them or
nonfederal governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents and
consequences of the relation between persons in se:r;-vice and the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by federal authority."' Id., at 143-144 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305-306 (1947)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See id., at 142 (finding relevant "the status of both the wronged and the
wrongdoer") (emphasis added).
Although one decision since Feres noted the military status of the
tortfeasors, see United States v. Brown, supra, at 112, it did not rely on
that fact. See id., at 113 ("We adhere ... to the line drawn in the Feres
case between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or in the
course of military duty"). Moreover, it is the broad language that consistently has been repeated in recent decisions describing the Feres doctrine.
See Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 299 ("Congress did not intend to subject the Government to ... claims [for injuries suffered by a soldier in
service] by a member of the Armed Forces") (emphasis added); Stencel
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 669 (In Feres ... the
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Nor have the lower courts understood this fact to be relevant
under Feres. 8 Instead, the Feres doctrine has been applied
consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members
Court held that an on-duty serviceman who is injured due to the negligence
of Government officials may not recover against the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act") (emphasis added); Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U. S. 15, 31, n. 25 (1953) (characterizing the Feres cases as involving "injuries . .. allegedly caused by negligence of employees of the
United States) (emphasis added).
8
The list of cases compiled by the dissent in this case, 779 F. 2d 1492,
1495-1496 (1986), in which the lower courts have interpreted Feres to bar
suit against the Government even though the negligence alleged was on the
part of a civilian employee is worth repeating: Potts v. United States, 723
F . 2d 20 (CA6 1983) (Navy corpsman injured when struck by a broken
cable from a hoist operated by civilians), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 959 (1984);
Warner v. United States, 720 F. 2d 837 (CA5 1983) (off-duty Army enlisted
man injured on base when motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by
civilian government employee); Jaffree v. United States, 663 F. 2d 1226
(CA3 1981) (serviceman injured by radiation exposure allegedly due in part
to intentional tort of civilian Department of Defense employees), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 972 (1982); Lewis v. United States, 663 F. 2d 889 (CA9
1981) (Marine Corps pilot killed in crash allegedly due to negligence of government maintenance employees), cert. denied, 457 U. S. 1133 (1982); Carter v. Cheyenne, 649 F. 2d 827 (CAlO 1981) (Air Force captain killed in
crash at city airport for which city brought third-party claim against FAA
air traffic controllers); Woodside v. United States, 606 F. 2d 134 (CA61979)
(Air Force officer killed in plane crash allegedly due to negligence of civilian flight instructor employed by military flight club), cert. denied, 445
U. S. 904 (1980); Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (CA9 1979)
(see supra, n. 3), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980); Watkins v. United
States, 462 F. Supp. 980 (SD Ga. 1978) (serviceman killed on base when
motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by civilian government employee), aff'd, 587 F. 2d 279 (CA5 1979); Hass v. United States, 518 F. 2d
1138 (CA4 1975) (suit by serviceman against civilian manager of militaryowned horse stable); United States v. Lee, 400 F. 2d 558 (CA9 1968) (serviceman killed in crash of military aircraft allegedly due to FAA air traffic
controller negligence), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1053 (1969); Sheppard v.
United States, 369 F. 2d 272 (CA3 1966) (same), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 982
(1967); Layne v. United States, 295 F. 2d 433 (CA71961) (National Guardsman killed on training flight allegedly due to negligence of civilian air traffic controllers), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 990 (1962); United States v. Wiener,
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against the Government based upon service-related injuries.
We decline to modify the doctrine at this late date.
A
This Court has emphasized three broad rationales underlying the Feres decision. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp.
v. United States , 431 U. S. 666, 671-673 (1977), and supra,
n. 2. An examination of these reasons for the doctrine demonstrates that the status of the alleged tortfeasor does not
have the critical significance ascribed to it by the Court of
Appeals in this case.9 First, "[t]he relationship between the
Government and members of its armed forces is 'distinctively
federal in character."' Feres, 340 U. S., at 143 (quoting
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301 , 305 (1947)).
This federal relationship is implicated to the greatest degree
when a service member is performing activities incident to
his federal service. Performance of the military function in
diverse parts of the country and the world entails a "[s]ignificant risk of accidents and injuries." Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 672. Where a service
member is injured incident to service-that is, because of his
military relationship with the Government-it "makes no
sense to permit the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negli335 F . 2d 379 (CA9 1964) (serviceman injured in part due to alleged CAA
employee negligence'), cert. dismissed sub nom., United Airlines, Inc . v.
United States, 379 U. S. 951 (1964).
9
Respondent puts great weight on this Court's recent observation that
factors other than the effect of a suit on military discipline are "no longer
controlling." United States v. Shearer, supra, at 58, n. 4. But these factors alone-the availability of veterans' benefits and the anomaly of applying local law to the federal relationship between a serviceman and the Government he is serving-could not be controlling, otherwise almost any suit
brought by a serviceman against the Government would be barred regardless of whether the underlying injury occurred incident to service or
whether the suit implicated military discipline concerns. Instead, these
factors have special weight in the context in which they were articulatedwhere a serviceman seeks to sue the Government for an injury incurred in
the course of an activity incident to service.
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gence to affect the liability of the Government to [the] serviceman." Ibid. Instead, application of the underlying fed-.
eral remedy that provides "simple, certain, and uniform
compensation for injuries or death of those in armed services," Feres, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted), is appropriate.
Second, the existence of these generous statutory disability and death benefits is an independent reason why the
Feres doctrine bars suit for service-related injuries. 10 In
Feres, the Court observed that the primary purpose of the
FTCA "was to extend a remedy to those who had been without; if it incidentally benefited those already well provided
for, it appears to have been unintentional." 340 U. S., at
140. Those injured during the course of activity incident to
service not only receive benefits that "compare extremely favorably with those provided by most workmen's compensation statutes," id., at 145, but the recovery of benefits is
"swift [and] efficient," Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States, supra, at 673, "normally requir[ing] no litigation," Feres, supra, at 145. The Court in Feres found it difficult to believe that Congress would have provided such a
comprehensive system of benefits while at the same time
contemplating recovery for service-related injuries under the
FTCA. Particularly persuasive was the fact that Congress
"omitted any provision to adjust these two types of remedy
to .each other." I d., at 144. Congress still has not amended
the Veterans' Benefits Act or the FTCA to make any such
provision for injuries incurred during the course of activity
incident to service. We thus find no reason to modify what
the Court has previously found to be the law: the statutory
veterans' benefits "provid[e] an upper limit of liability for the
Government as to service-connected injuries." Stencel v.
10

Service members receive numerous other benefits unique to their
service status. For example, members of the military and their dependents are eligible for educational benefits, extensive health benefits, homebuying loan benefits, and retirement benefits after a minimum of 20 years
of service. See generally Uniformed Services Almanac (1985).
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Aero 'Engineering Corp .. v. United States, supra, at 673.
See Hatzlachh Supply Co . v. United States, 444 U. S. 460,
464 (1980) (per curiam) ("[T]he Veterans' Benefits Act provided compensation to injured servicemen, which we understood Congress intended to be the sole remedy for serviceconnected injuries").
Third, Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by
service members against the Government for injuries incurred incident to service are barred by the F eres doctrine
because they are the "type[ s] of claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness."
United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 59 (emphasis in origi.~
nal). In every respect the military is, as this Court has recognized, "a specialized society." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S.
733, 743 (1974). "[T]o accomplish its mission the military
must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and
esprit de corps." Goldman v. Weinberger,-- U. S.--,
- - (1986). Even if military negligence is not specifically
alleged in a tort action, a suit based upon service-related activity necessarily implicates the military judgments and decisions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of
the military mission. 11 Moreover, military discipline involves not only obedience to orders, but more generally duty
and loyalty to one's service and to one's country. Suits
brought by service members against the Government for
service-related injuries could undermine the commitment essential to effective service and thus have the potential to disrupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the word.
11

Civilian employees of the Government also may play an integral role in
military activities. In this circumstance, an inquiry into the civilian activities would have the same effect on military discipline as a direct inquiry
into military judgments. For example, the FAA and the United States
Armed Services have an established working relationship that provides for
FAA participation in numerous military activities. See FAA, U. S. Dept.
of Transp. , Order 7610.4F: Special Military Operations (Jan. 21, 1981).
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In this case, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed
while performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a primary duty of the Coast Guard. See 14 U. S. C. §§ 2,
88(a)(l). 12 There is no dispute that Johnson's injury arose directly out of the rescue mission, or that the mission was an
activity incident to his military service. Johnson went on
the rescue mission specifically because of his military status.
His wife received and is continuing to receive statutory benefits on .account of his death. Because Johnson was acting
pursuant to standard operating procedures of the Coast
Guard, the potential that a suit in this case could implicate
military discipline is substantial. The circumstances of this
case thus fall within the heart of the Feres doctrine as it consistently has been articulated.

III
We reaffirm the holding of Feres that "the Government is
not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at .146.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

12
The Coast Guard , of course, is a military service, and an important
branch of the armed services. 14 U. S. C. § 1.
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court
This case presents the question whether the doctrine established in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950) , bars
an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of a
service member killed during the course of an activity incident to service, where the complaint alleges negligence on
the part of civilian employees of the Federal Government.
I
Lieutenant Commander Horton Winfield Johnson was a
helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard, stationed
in Hawaii. In the early morning of January 7, 1982, Johnson's Coast Guard station received a distress call from a boat
lost in the area. Johnson and a crew of several other Coast
Guard members were dispatched to search for the vessel.
Inclement weather decreased the visibility, and so Johnson
requested radar assistance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a civilian agency of the Federal Government. The FAA controllers assumed positive radar control
over the helicopter. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter
crashed into the side of a mountain on the island of :Jolokai.
All the crew members, including Johnson, were killed in the
crash.
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Respondent, Johnson's wife, applied for and received veterans' benefits as a result of her husband's death. 1 In addition, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680. Her complaint
sought damages from the United States on the ground that
the FAA controllers negligently caused her husband's death.
The Government filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that because Johnson was killed during the course of his military duties, respondent could not recover damages from the United
States. The District Court agreed and dismissed the complaint, relying exclusively on this Court's decision in Feres.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
749 F. 2d 1530 (1985). It noted the language of Feres that
precludes suits by service members against the Government
for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. The court found,
however, that the evolution of the doctrine since the Feres
decision warranted a qualification of the original holding according to the status of the alleged tortfeasor. The court
identified what it termed "the typical Feres factual paradigm" that is present when a service member alleges negligence on the part of another member of the military. 749 F.
2d, at 1537. "[W]hen the Feres factual paradigm is present,
the issue is whether the injury arose out of or during the
course of an activity incident to service." Ibid. But when
negligence is alleged on the part of a Federal Government
employee who is not a member of the military, the court
found that the propriety of a suit should be determined by
' Respondent has received $35,690.66 in life insurance, a $3,000 death
gratuity, and receives approximately $868 per month in dependency and
compensatory benefits. Brief for United States 3, n. 1. The dependency
and compensatory benefits normally are payable for the life of the surviving spouse and include an extra monthly sum for any surviving child of the
veteran below age 18. See 38 U. S. C. §§ 410, 411 (1982 ed. and Supp.
III); 38 CFR § 3.461 (1986).
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examining the rationales that underlie the Feres doctrine.
Although it noted that this Court has articulated numerous
rationales for the doctrine, 2 it found the effect of a suit on
military discipline to be the doctrine's primary justification.
Applying its new analysis to the facts of this case, the court
found "absolutely no hint . . . that the conduct of any alleged
tortfeasor even remotely connected to the military will be
scrutinized if this case proceeds to trial." 749 F. 2d, at 1539.
Accordingly, it found that Feres did not bar respondent's
suit. The court acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, "in a case strikingly similar to this one, has
reached the opposite conclusion." 749 F. 2d, at 1539. (citing Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980)). 3 It concluded, however, that
"Uptegrove was wrongly decided," 749 F. 2d, at 1539. and declined to reach the same result.
The Court of Appeals granted the Government's suggestion for rehearing en bane. The en bane court found that this
Court's recent decision in United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S.
'We have identified three factors that underlie the F eres doctrine:
"First, the relationship between the Government and members of its
Armed Forces is" 'distinctively federal in character,'"; it would make little
sense to have the Government's liability to members of the Armed Services
dependent on the fortuity of where the soldier happened to be stationed at
the time of the injury. Second, the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes, as
a substitute for tort liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation scheme
which provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to
any negligence attributable to the Government. A third factor ... [is]
'[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military
duty .... '" Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S.
666, 671-672 (1977) (citations omitted).
8
In Uptegrove , the wife of a Navy lieutenant killed while flying home on
an Air Force C-141 transport brought suit against the Government under
the FTCA, alleging negligence on the part of three FAA air traffic controllers. The court in Uptegrove dismissed the suit on the basis of Feres.
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52 (1985) "reinforc[ed] the analysis set forth in the panel opinion," 779 F. 2d 1492, 1493 (1986) (per curiam), particularly
the "[s]pecial emphasis . . . upon military discipline and
whether or not the claim being considered would require civilian courts to second-guess military decisions," id., at
1493-1494. It concluded that the panel properly had evaluated the claim under F eres and therefore reinstated the panel
opm10n. Judge Johnson, joined by three other judges,
strongly dissented. The dissent rejected the "Feres factual
paradigm" as identified by the court, finding that because
"Johnson's injury was undoubtedly sustained incident to
service, ... under current law our decision ought to be a relatively straightforward affirmance." Id., at 1494.
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. - - (1986), to review the
Court of Appeals' reformulation of the Feres doctrine and to
resolve the conflict among the Circuits on the issue. 4 We
now reverse.
II

In Feres, this Court held that service members cannot
bring tort suits against the Government for injuries that
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. This Court has never deviated
from this characterization of the Feres bar. 5 Nor has Congress changed this standard in the more than 35 years since it
was articulated, even though, as the Court noted in Feres,
Congress "possesses a ready remedy" to alter a misinterpre'In addition to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Uptegrove, specifically acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in this
case, the decision conflicts in principle with the decisions of the Courts of
Appeals cited infra, n. 8.
5
See United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112 (1954); United States
v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 159 (1963); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States, supra, at 671; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 299
(1983); United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 52, 57 (1985).
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tation of its intent. I d., at 138. 6 Although all of the cases
decided by this Court under Feres have involved allegations
of negligence on the part of members of the military, this
Court has never suggested that the military status of the alleged tortfeasor is crucial to the application of the doctrine. 7
Congress has recently considered, but not enacted, legislation that
would allow service members to bring medical malpractice suits against the
Government. See H. R. 1161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H. R. 1942,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
7
In two places in the Feres opinion, the Court suggested that the military status of the tortfeasor might be relevant to its decision. First, the
Court identified "[t]he common fact underlying the three cases" as being
"that each claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough , sustained
injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces." 340 U. S., at 138
(emphasis added). Second, in discussing one of several grounds for the
holding, the Court stated: "It would hardly be a rational plan of providing
for those disabled in service by others in service to leave them dependent
upon geographic considerations over which they have no control." I d., at
143 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the language of the opinion, viewed
as a whole, is broad: "We know of no American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers
or the Government he is serving," id., at 141 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted); "' . . . To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the
relations between soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal
incidents and consequences of the relation between persons in service and
the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by federal authority."' ld., at 143-144 (quoting United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301 , 305-306 (1947)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See id., at 142 (finding relevant "the status of both the
wronged and the wrongdoer") (emphasis added).
Although one decision since Feres noted the military status of the
tortfeasors, see United States v. Brown, supra, at 112, it did not rely on
that fact. See 348 U. S., at 113 ("We adhere . .. to the line drawn in the
Feres case between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or
in the course of military duty"). Moreover, it is the broad language that
consistently has been repeated in recent decisions describing the Feres
doctrine. See Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 299 ("Congress did not intend to subject the Government to . .. claims [for injuries suffered by a
soldier in service] by a member of the Armed Forces") (eraphasis added);
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 669 (In Feres
6
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Nor have the lower courts understood this fact to be relevant
under Feres. 8 Instead, the Feres doctrine has been applied
consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members
... the Court held that an on-duty serviceman who is injured due to the
negligence of Government officials may not recover against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act") (emphasis added); Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31, n. 25 (1953) (characterizing the Feres cases
as involving "injuries ... allegedly caused by negligence of employees of
the United States) (emphasis added).
8
The list of cases compiled by the dissent in this case, 779 F. 2d 1492,
1495-1496 (1986), in which the lower courts have interpreted Feres to bar
suit against the Government even though the negligence alleged was on the
part of a civilian employee is worth repeating: Potts v. United States, 723
F. 2d 20 (CA6 1983) (Navy corpsman injured when struck by a broken
cable from a hoist operated by civilians), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 959 (1984);
Warner v. United States , 720 F . 2d 837 (CA5 1983) (off-duty Army enlisted
man injured on base when motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by
civilian government employee); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F. 2d 1226
(CA3 1981) (serviceman injured by radiation exposure allegedly due in part
to intentional tort of civilian Department of Defense employees), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 972 (1982); Lewis v. United States, 663 F. 2d 889 (CA9
1981) (Marine Corps pilot killed in crash allegedly due to negligence of government maintenance employees), cert. denied, 457 U. S. 1133 (1982); Carter v. Cheyenne, 649 F . 2d 827 (CAlO 1981) (Air Force captain killed in
crash at city airport for which city brought third-party claim against FAA
air traffic controllers); Woodside v. United States, 606 F. 2d 134 (CA61979)
(Air Force officer killed in plane crash allegedly due to negligence of civilian flight instructor employed by military flight club), cert. denied, 445
U. S. 904 (1980); Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F . 2d 1248 (CA9 1979)
(see n. 3, supra), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980); Watkins v. United
States, 462 F. Supp. 980 (SD Ga. 1978) (serviceman killed on base when
motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by civilian government employee), aff'd, 587 F. 2d 279 (CA5 1979); Hass v. United States, 518 F. 2d
1138 (CA4 1975) (suit by serviceman against civilian manager of militaryowned horse stable); United States v. Lee, 400 F. 2d 558 (CA9 1968) (serviceman killed in crash of military aircraft allegedly due to FAA air traffic
controller negligence), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1053 (1969); Sheppard v.
United States, 369 F . 2d 272 (CA3 1966) (same), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 982
(1967); Layne v. United States, 295 F. 2d 433 (CA71961) (National Guardsman killed on training flight allegedly due to negligence of civilian air traffic controllers), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 990 (1962); United Air Lines, Inc.
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against the Government based upon service-related injuries.
We decline to modify the doctrine at this late date.
A

This Court has emphasized three broad rationales underlying the Feres decision. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp.
v. United States, 431 U. S. 666, 671-673 (1977), and n. 2,
supra. An examination of these reasons for the doctrine
demonstrates that the status of the alleged tortfeasor does
not have the critical significance ascribed to it by the Court of
Appeals in this case. 9 First, "[t]he relationship between the
Government and members of its armed forces is 'distinctively
federal in character."' Feres, 340 U. S., at 143 (quoting
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305 (1947)).
This federal relationship is implicated to the greatest degree
when a service member is performing activities incident to
his federal service. Performance of the military function in
diverse parts of the country and the world entails a "[s]ignificant risk of accidents and injuries." Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 672. Where a service
member is injured incident to service-that is, because of his
military relationship with the Government-it "makes no
sense to permit the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negliv. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379 (CA9) (serviceman injured in part due to alleged
CAA employee negligence), cert. dismissed sub nom., United Air Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 951 (1964).
9
Respondent puts great weight on this Court's recent observation that
factors other than the effect of a suit on military discipline are "no longer
controlling." United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 58, n. 4. But these
factors alone-the availability of veterans' benefits and the anomaly of applying local law to the federal relationship between a serviceman and the
Government he is serving-could not be controlling, otherwise almost any
suit brought by a serviceman against the Government would be barred regardless of whether the underlying injury occurred incident to service or
whether the suit implicated military discipline concerns. Instead, these
factors have special weight in the context in which they were articulatedwhere a serviceman seeks tJ sue the Government for an injury incurred in
the course of an activity incident to service.

85-2039-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON

8

gence to affect the liability of the Government to [the] serviceman." Ibid. Instead, application of the underlying federal remedy that provides "simple, certain, and uniform
compensation for injuries or death of those in armed services," Feres, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted), is appropriate.
Second, the existence of these generous statutory disability and death benefits is an independent reason why the
Feres doctrine bars suit for service-related injuries. 10 In
Feres, the Court observed that the primary purpose of the
FTCA "was to extend a remedy to those who had been without; if it incidentally benefited those already well provided
for, it appears to have been unintentional." 340 U. S., at
140. Those injured during the course of activity incident to
service not only receive benefits that "compare extremely favorably with those provided by most workmen's compensation statutes," id., at 145, but the recovery of benefits is
"swift [and] efficient," Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States, supra, at 673, "normally requir[ing] no litigation," Feres, supra, at 145. The Court in Feres found it difficult to believe that Congress would have provided such a
comprehensive system of benefits while at the same time
contemplating recovery for service-related injuries under the
FTCA. Particularly persuasive was the fact that Congress
"omitted any provision to adjust these two types of remedy
to each other." ld., at 144. Congress still has not amended
the Veterans' Benefits Act or the FTCA to make any such
provision for injuries incurred during the course of activity
incident to service. We thus find no reason to modify what
the Court has previously found to be the law: the statutory
veterans' benefits "provid[e] an upper limit of liability for the
Service members receive numerous other benefits unique to their
service status. For example, members of the military and their dependents are eligible for educational benefits, extensive health benefits, homebuying loan benefits, and retirement benefits after a minimum of 20 years
of service. See generally Uniformed Services A!;nanac (L. Sharff & S.
Gordon eds. 1985).
10
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Government as to service-connected injuries." Stencel v.
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 673.
See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460,
464 (1980) (per curiam) ("[T]he Veterans' Benefits Act provided compensation to injured servicemen, which we understood Congress intended to be the sole remedy for serviceconnected injuries").
Third, Feres and its proge_ny indicate that suits brought by
service members against the Government for injuries incurred incident to service are barred by the Feres doctrine
because they are the "type[s] of claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness."
United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 59 (emphasis in original). In every respect the military is, as this Court has recognized, "a specialized society." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S.
733, 743 (1974). "[T]o accomplish its mission the military
must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and
esprit de corps." Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. - - ,
- - (1986). Even if military negligence is not specifically
alleged in a tort action, a suit based upon service-related activity necessarily implicates the military judgments and decisions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of
the military mission.u Moreover, military discipline involves not only obedience to orders, but more generally duty
and loyalty to one's service and to one's country. Suits
brought by service members against the Government for
service-related injuries could undermine the commitment esCivilian employees of the Government also may play an integral role in
military activities. In this circumstance, an inquiry into the civilian activities would have the same effect on military discipline as a direct inquiry
into military judgments. For example, the FAA and the United States
Armed Services have an established working relationship that provides for
FAA participation in numerous military activities. See FAA, United
States Dept. of Transportation, Handbook 7610.4F: Special Military Operations (Jan. 21, 1981).
11
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sential to effective service and thus have the potential to disrupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the word.
B
In this case, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed
while performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a primary duty of the Coast Guard. See 14 U. S. C. §§ 2,
88(a)(1). '2 There is no dispute that Johnson's injury arose directly out of the rescue mission, or that the mission was an
activity incident to his military service. Johnson went on
the rescue mission specifically because of his military status.
His wife received and is continuing to receive statutory benefits on account of his death. Because Johnson was acting
pursuant to standard operating procedures of the Coast
Guard, the potential that this suit could implicate military
discipline is substantial. The circumstances of this case thus
fall within the heart of the Feres doctrine as it consistently
has been articulated.

III
We reaffirm the holding of Feres that "the Government is
not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

12

The Coast Guard, of course, is a military service, and an important
branch of the armed services. 14 U. S. C. § 1.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court
This case presents the question whether the doctrine established in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950), bars
an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of a
service member killed during the course of an activity incident to service, where the complaint alleges negligence on
the part of civilian employees of the Federal Government.
I
Lieutenant Commander Horton Winfield Johnson was a
helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard, stationed
in Hawaii. In the early morning of January 7, 1982, Johnson's Coast Guard station received a distress call from a boat
lost in the area. Johnson and a crew of several other Coast
Guard members were dispatched to search for the vessel.
Inclement weather decreased the visibility, and so Johnson
requested radar assistance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a civilian agency of the Federal Government. The FAA controllers assumed positive radar control
over the helicopter. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter
crashed into the side of a mountain on the island of Molokai.
All the crew members, including Johnson, were killed in the
crash.
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Respondent, Johnson's wife, applied for and received veterans' benefits as a result of her husband's death. 1 In addition, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680. Her complaint
sought damages from the United States on the ground that
the FAA controllers negligently caused her husband's death.
The Government filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that because Johnson was killed during the course of his military duties, respondent could not recover damages from the United
States. The District Court agreed and dismissed the complaint, relying exclusively on this Court's decision in Feres.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
749 F. 2d 1530 (1985). It noted the language of Feres that
precludes suits by service members against the Government
for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. The court found,
however, that the evolution of the doctrine since the Feres
decision warranted a qualification of the original holding according to the status of the alleged tortfeasor. The court
identified what it termed "the typical Feres factual paradigm" that is present when a service member alleges negligence on the part of another member of the military. 749 F.
2d, at 1537. "[W]hen the Feres factual paradigm is present,
the issue is whether the injury arose out of or during the
course of an activity incident to service." Ibid. But when
negligence is alleged on the part of a Federal Government
employee who is not a member of the military, the court
found that the propriety of a suit should be determined by
Respondent has received $35,690.66 in life insurance, a $3,000 death
gratuity, and receives approximately $868 per month in dependency and
compensatory benefits. Brief for United States 3, n. 1. The dependency
and compensatory benefits normally are payable for the life of the surviving spouse and include an extra monthly sum for any surviving child of the
veteran below age 18. See 38 U. S. C. §§ 410, 411 (1982 ed. and Supp.
III); 38 CFR § 3.461 (1986).
1
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examining the rationales that underlie the Feres doctrine.
Although it noted that this Court has articulated numerous
rationales for the doctrine, 2 it found the effect of a suit on
military discipline to be the doctrine's primary justification.
Applying its new analysis to the facts of this case, the court
found "absolutely no hint . . . that the conduct of any alleged
tortfeasor even remotely connected to the military will be
scrutinized ifthis case proceeds to trial." 749 F. 2d, at 1539.
Accordingly, it found that Feres did not bar respondent's
suit. The court acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, "in a case strikingly similar to this one, has
reached the opposite conclusion." 749 F. 2d, at 1539. (citing Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980)). 3 It concluded, however, that
"Uptegrove was wrongly decided," 749 F. 2d, at 1539. and declined to reach the same result.
The Court of Appeals granted the Government's suggestion for rehearing en bane. The en bane court found that this
Court's recent decision in United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S.
We have identified three factors that underlie the F eres doctrine:
"First, the relationship between the Government and members of its
Armed Forces is" 'distinctively federal in character,'"; it would make little
sense to have the Government's liability to members of the Armed Services
dependent on the fortuity of where the soldier happened to be stationed at
the time of the injury. Second, the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes, as
a substitute for tort liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation scheme
which provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to
any negligence attributable to the Government. A third factor ... [is]
'[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military
duty .... '" Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S.
666, 671-672 (1977) (citations omitted).
3
In Uptegrove, the wife of a Navy lieutenant killed while flying home on
an Air Force C-141 transport brought suit against the Government under
the FTCA, alleging negligence on the part of three FAA air traffic controllers. The court in Uptegrove dismissed the suit on the basis of Feres.
2
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52 (1985) "reinforc[ed] the analysis set forth in the panel opinion," 779 F. 2d 1492, 1493 (1986) (per curiam), particularly
the "[s]pecial emphasis . . . upon military discipline and
whether or not the claim being considered would require civilian courts to second-guess military decisions," id., at
1493-1494. It concluded that the panel properly had evaluated the claim under F eres and therefore reinstated the panel
opm10n. Judge Johnson, joined by three other judges,
strongly dissented. The dissent rejected the "Feres factual
paradigm" as identified by the court, finding that because
"Johnson's injury was undoubtedly sustained incident to
service, ... under current law our decision ought to be a relatively straightforward affirmance." Id., at 1494.
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. - - (1986), to review the
Court of Appeals' reformulation of the Feres doctrine and to
resolve the conflict among the Circuits on the issue. 4 We
now reverse.
II

In Feres, this Court held that service members cannot
bring tort suits against the Government for injuries that
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. This Court has never deviated
from this characterization of the Feres bar. 5 Nor has Congress changed this standard in the more than 35 years since it
was articulated, even though, as the Court noted in Feres,
Congress "possesses a ready remedy" to alter a misinterpre• In addition to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
' in Uptegrove, specifically acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in this
case, the decision conflicts in principle with the decisions of the Courts of
Appeals cited infra, n. 8.
5
See United States v. Brown, 348 U, S. 110, 112 (1954); United States
v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 159 (1963); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States, supra, at 671; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 299
(1983); United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 52, 57 (1985).
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tation of its intent. I d., at 138. 6 Although all of the cases
decided by this Court under Feres have involved allegations
of negligence on the part of members of the military, this
Court has never suggested that the military status of the alleged tortfeasor is crucial to the application of the doctrine. 7
Congress has recently considered, but not enacted, legislation that
would allow service members to bring medical malpractice suits against the
Government. See H. R. 1161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H. R. 1942,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
7
In two places in the Feres opinion, the Court suggested that the military status of the tortfeasor might be relevant to its decision. First, the
Court identified "[t]he common fact underlying the three cases" as being
"that each claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained
injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces." 340 U. S., at 138
(emphasis added). Second, in discussing one of several grounds for the
holding, the Court stated: "It would hardly be a rational plan of providing
for those disabled in service by others in service to leave them dependent
upon geographic considerations over which they have no control." Id., at
143 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the language of the opinion, viewed
as a whole, is broad: "We know of no American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers
or the Government he is serving," id., at 141 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted); "' . . . To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the
relations between soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal
incidents and consequences of the relation between persons in service and
the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by federal authority."' Id., at 143-144 (quoting United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305-306 (1947)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See id., at 142 (finding relevant "the status of both the
wronged and the wrongdoer") (emphasis added).
Although one decision since Feres noted the military status of the
tortfeasors, see United States v. Brown, supra, at 112, it did not rely on
that fact. See 348 U. S., at 113 ("We adhere ... to the line drawn in the
Feres case between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or
in the course of military duty"). Moreover, it is the broad language that
consistently has been repeated in recent decisions describing the Feres
doctrine. See Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 299 ("Congress did not intend to subject the Government to ... claims [for injuries suffered by a
soldier in service] by a member of the Armed Forces") (emphasis added);
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 669 (In Feres
6
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Nor have the lower courts understood this fact to be relevant
under Feres. 8 Instead, the Feres doctrine has been applied
consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members
... the Court held that an on-duty serviceman who is injured due to the
negligence of Government officials may not recover against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act") (emphasis added); Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31, n. 25 (1953) (characterizing the Feres cases
as involving "injuries ... allegedly caused by negligence of employees of
the United States) (emphasis added).
8
The list of cases compiled by the dissent in this case, 779 F. 2d 1492,
1495-1496 (1986), in which the lower courts have interpreted Feres to bar
suit against the Government even though the negligence alleged was on the
part of a civilian employee is worth repeating: Potts v. United States, 723
F. 2d 20 (CA6 1983) (Navy corpsman injured when struck by a broken
cable from a hoist operated by civilians), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 959 (1984);
Warner v. United States, 720 F. 2d 837 (CA5 1983) (off-duty Army enlisted
man injured on base when motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by
civilian government employee); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F. 2d 1226
(CA3 1981) (serviceman injured by radiation exposure allegedly due in part
to intentional tort of civilian Department of Defense employees), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 972 (1982); Lewis v. United States, 663 F. 2d 889 (CA9
1981) (Marine Corps pilot killed in crash allegedly due to negligence of government maintenance employees), cert. denied, 457 U. S. 1133 (1982); Carter v. Cheyenne, 649 F. 2d 827 (CAlO 1981) (Air Force captain killed in
crash at city airport for which city brought third-party claim against FAA
air traffic controllers); Woodside v. United States, 606 F. 2d 134 (CA61979)
(Air Force officer killed in plane crash allegedly due to negligence of civilian flight instructor employed by military flight club), cert. denied, 445
U. S. 904 (1980); Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (CA9 1979)
(see n. 3, supra), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980); Watkins v. United
States, 462 F. Supp. 980 (SD Ga. 1978) (serviceman killed on base when
motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by civilian government employee), aff'd, 587 F. 2d 279 (CA5 1979); Hass v. United States, 518 F. 2d
1138 (CA4 1975) (suit by serviceman against civilian manager of militaryowned horse stable); United States v. Lee, 400 F. 2d 558 (CA9 1968) (serviceman killed in crash of military aircraft allegedly due to FAA air traffic
controller negligence), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1053 (1969); Sheppard v.
United States, 369 F. 2d 272 (CA3 1966) (same), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 982
(1967); Layne v. United States, 295 F. 2d 433 (CA71961) (National Guardsman killed on training flight allegedly due to negligence of civilian air traffic controllers), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 990 (1962); United Air Lines, Inc.
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against the Government based upon service-related injuries.
We decline to modify the doctrine at this late date.
A

This Court has emphasized three broad rationales underlying the Feres decision. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp.
v. United States, 431 U. S. 666, 671-673 (1977), and n. 2,
supra. An examination of these reasons for the doctrine
demonstrates that the status of the alleged tortfeasor does
not have the critical significance ascribed to it by the Court of
Appeals in this case. First, "[t]he relationship between the
Government and members of its armed forces is 'distinctively
federal in character."' Feres, 340 U. S., at 143 (quoting
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305 (1947)).
This federal relationship is implicated to the greatest degree
when a service member is performing activities incident to
his federal service. Performance of the military function in
diverse parts of the country and the world entails a "[s]ignificant risk of accidents and injuries." Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 672. Where a service
member is injured incident to service-that is, because of his
military relationship with the Government-it "makes no
sense to permit the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negligence to affect the liability of the Government to [the] serviceman." Ibid. Instead, application of the underlying federal remedy that provides "simple, certain, and uniform
compensation for injuries or death of those in armed services," Feres, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted), is appropriate.
Second, the existence of these generous statutory disability and death benefits is an independent reason why the
v. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379 (CA9) (serviceman injured in part due to alleged
CAA employee negligence), cert. dismissed sub nom., United Air Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 951 (1964).
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Feres doctrine bars suit for service-related injuries. 9 In
Feres, the Court observed that the primary purpose of the
FTCA "was to extend a remedy to those who had been without; if it incidentally benefited those already well provided
for, it appears to have been unintentional." 340 U. S., at
140. Those injured during the course of activity incident to
service not only receive benefits that "compare extremely favorably with those provided by most workmen's compensation statutes," id., at 145, but the recovery of benefits is
"swift [and] efficient," Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States, supra, at 673, "normally requir[ing] no litigation," Feres, supra, at 145. The Court in Feres found it difficult to believe that Congress would have provided such a
comprehensive system of benefits while at the same time
contemplating recovery for service-related injuries under the
FTCA. Particularly persuasive was the fact that Congress
"omitted any provision to adjust these two types of remedy
to each other." !d., at 144. Congress still has not amended
the Veterans' Benefits Act or the FTCA to make any such
provision for injuries incurred during the course of activity
incident to service. We thus find no reason to modify what
the Court has previously found to be the law: the statutory
veterans' benefits "provid[e] an upper limit of liability for the
Government as to service-connected injuries." Stencel v.
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 673.
See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460,
464 (1980) (per curiam) ("[T]he Veterans' Benefits Act provided compensation to injured servicemen, which we understood Congress intended to be the sole remedy for serviceconnected injuries").
9
Service members receive numerous other benefits unique to their
service status. For example, members of the military and their dependents are eligible for educational benefits, extensive health benefits, homebuying loan benefits, and retirement benefits after a minimum of 20 years
of service. See generally Uniformed Services Almanac (L. Sharff & S.
Gordon eds. 1985).
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Third, Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by
service members against the Government for injuries incurred incident to service are barred by the F eres doctrine
because they are the "type[ s] of claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness."
United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 59 (emphasis in original). In every respect the military is, as this Court has recognized, "a specialized society." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S.
733, 743 (1974). "[T]o accomplish its mission the military
must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and
esprit de corps;" Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. - - ,
- - (1986). Even if military negligence is not specifically
alleged in a tort action, a suit based upon service-related activity necessarily implicates the military judgments and decisions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of
the military mission. 10 Moreover, military discipline involves not only obedience to orders, but more generally duty
and loyalty to one's service and to one's country. Suits
brought by service members against the Government for
service-related injuries could undermine the commitment essential to effective service and thus have the potential to disrupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the word.
B

In this case, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed
while performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a primary duty of the Coast Guard. See 14 U. S. C. §§ 2,
10

Civilian employees of the Government also may play an integral role in
military activities. In this circumstance, an inquiry into the civilian activities would have the same effect on military discipline as a direct inquiry
into military judgments. For example, the FAA and the United States
Armed Services have an established working relationship that provides for
FAA participation in numerous military activities. See FAA, United
States Dept. of Transportation, Handbook 7610.4F: Special Military Operations (Jan. 21, 1981).
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88(a)(l). 11 There is no dispute that Johnson's injury arose directly out of the rescue mission, or that the mission was an
activity incident to his military service. Johnson went on
the rescue mission specifically because of his military status.
His wife received and is continuing to receive statutory benefits on account of his death. Because Johnson was acting
pursuant to standard operating procedures of the Coast
Guard, the potential that this suit could implicate military
discipline is substantial. The circumstances of this case thus
fall within the heart of the Feres doctrine as it consistently ·
has been articulated.
III
We reaffirm the holding of Feres that "the Government is
not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

11

The Coast Guard, of course, is a military service, and an important
branch of the armed services. 14 U. S. C. § 1.
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, 1987]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court
This case presents the question whether the doctrine established in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950), bars
an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of a
service member killed during the course of an activity incident to service, where the complaint alleges neglig~nce on
the part of civilian employees of the Federal Government.
I
Lieutenant Commander Horton Winfield Johnson was a
helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard, stationed
in Hawaii. In the early morning of January 7, 1982, Johnson's Coast Guard station received a distress call from a boat
lost in the area. Johnson and a crew of several other Coast
Guard members were dispatched to search for the vessel.
Inclement weather decreased the visibility, and so Johnson
requested radar assistance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a civilian agency of the Federal Government. The FAA controllers assumed positive radar control
over the helicopter. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter
crashed into the side of a mountain on the island of Molokai.
All the crew members, including Johnson, were killed in the
crash.
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Respondent, Johnson's wife, applied for and received veterans' benefits as a result of her husband's death. 1 In addition, she filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), 28 U. S. C.§§ 1346,2671-2680. Her complaint
sought damages from the United States on the ground that
the FAA controllers negligently caused her husband's death.
The Government filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that because Johnson was killed during the course of his military duties, respondent could not recover damages from the United
States. The District Court agreed and dismissed the complaint, relying exclusively on this Court's decision in Feres.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
749 F. 2d 1530 (1985). It noted the language of Feres that
precludes suits by service members against the Government
for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. The court found,
however, that the evolution of the doctrine since the Feres
decision warranted a qualification of the original holding according to the status of the alleged tortfeasor. The court
identified what it termed "the typical Feres factual paradigm" that is present when a service member alleges negligence on the part of another member of the military. 749 F.
2d, at 1537. "[W]hen the Feres factual paradigm is present,
the issue is whether the injury arose out of or during the
course of an activity incident to service." Ibid. But when
negligence is alleged on the part of a Federal Government
employee who is not a member of the military, the court
found that the propriety of a suit should be determined by
'Respondent has received $35,690.66 in life insurance, a $3,000 death
gratuity, and receives approximately $868 per month in dependency and
compensatory benefits. Brief for United States 3, n. 1. The dependency
and compensatory benefits normally are payable for the life of the surviving spouse and include an extra monthly sum for any surviving child of the
veteran below age 18. See 38 U. S. C. §§ 410, 411 (1982 ed. and Supp.
III); 38 CFR § 3.461 (1986).
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examining the rationales that underlie the Feres doctrine.
Although it noted that this Court has articulated numerous
rationales for the doctrine, 2 it found the effect of a suit on
military discipline to be the doctrine's primary justification.
Applying its new analysis to the facts of this case, the court
found "absolutely no hint . . . that the conduct of any alleged
tortfeasor even remotely connected to the military will be
scrutinized if this case proceeds to trial." 749 F. 2d, at 1539.
Accordingly, it found that Feres did not bar respondent's
suit. The court acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, "in a case strikingly similar to this one, has
reached the opposite conclusion." 749 F. 2d, at 1539. (citing Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980)). 3 It concluded, however, that
"Uptegrove was wrongly decided," 749 F. 2d, at 1539. and declined to reach the same result.
The Court of Appeals granted the Government's suggestion for rehearing en bane. The en bane court found that this
Court's recent decision in United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S.
We have identified three factors that underlie the Feres doctrine:
"First, the relationship between the Government and members of its
Armed Forces is" 'distinctively federal in character,'"; it would make little
sense to have the Government's liability to members of the Armed Services
dependent on the fortuity of where the soldier happened to be stationed at
the time of the injury. Second, the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes, as
a substitute for tort liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation, scheme
which provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to
any negligence attributable to the Government. A third factor ... [is]
'[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military
duty .... '" Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S.
666, 671-672 (1977) (citations omitted).
3
In Uptegrove, the wife of a Navy lieutenant killed while flying home on
an Air Force C-141 transport brought suit against the Government under
the FTCA, alleging negligence on the part of three FAA air traffic controllers. The court in Uptegrove dismissed the suit on the basis of Feres.
2
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52 (1985) "reinforc[ed] the analysis set forth in the panel opinion," 779 F. 2d 1492, 1493 (1986) (per curiam), particularly
the "[s]pecial emphasis . . . upon military discipline and
whether or not the claim being considered would require civilian courts to second-guess military decisions," id., at
1493-1494. It concluded that the panel properly had evaluated the claim under Feres and therefore reinstated the panel
opmwn. Judge Johnson, joined by three other judges,
strongly dissented. The dissent rejected the "Feres factual
paradigm" as identified by the court, finding that because
"Johnson's injury was undoubtedly sustained incident to
service, ... under current law our decision ought to be a relatively straightforward affirmance." I d., at 1494.
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. - - (1986), to review the
Court of Appeals' reformulation of the Feres doctrine and to
resolve the conflict among the Circuits on the issue. 4 We
now reverse.
II

In Feres, this Court held that service members cannot
bring tort suits against the Government for injuries that
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. This Court has never deviated
from this characterization of the Feres bar. 5 Nor has Congress changed this standard in the more than 35 years ~ince it
was articulated, even though, as the Court noted in Feres,
Congress "possesses a ready remedy" to alter a misinterpre'In addition to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Uptegrove, specifically acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in this
case, the decision conflicts in principle with the decisions of the Courts of
Appeals cited irifra, n. 8.
6
See United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112 (1954); United States
v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 159 (1963); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States, supra, at 671; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 299
(1983); United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 52, 57 (1985).
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tation of its intent. I d., at 138. 6 Although all of the cases
decided by this Court under Feres have involved allegations
of negligence on the part of members of the military, this
Court has never suggested that the military status of the alleged tortfeasor is crucial to the application of the doctrine. 7
Congress has recently considered, but not enacted, legislation that
would allow service members to bring medical malpractice suits against the
Government. See H. R. 1161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H. R. 1942,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
7
In two places in the Feres opinion, the Court suggested that the military status of the tortfeasor might be relevant to its decision. First, the
Court identified "[t]he common fact underlying the three cases" as being
"that each claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained
injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces." 340 U. S., at 138
(emphasis added). Second, in discussing one of several grounds for the
holding, the Court stated: "It would hardly be a rational plan of providing
for those disabled in service by others in service to leave them dependent
upon geographic considerations over which they have no control." !d., at
143 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the language of the opinion, viewed
as a whole, is broad: "We know of no American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers
or the Government he is serving," id., at 141 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted); "' . . . To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the
relations between soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons outside them or norifederal governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal
incidents and consequences of the relation between persons in service and
the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by federal authority.'" !d., at 143-144 (quoting United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305-306 (1947)) (emphasis adde,d) (citations omitted). See id., at 142 (finding relevant "the status of both the
wronged and the wrongdoer") (emphasis added).
Although one decision since Feres noted the military status of the
tortfeasors, see United States v. Brown, supra, at 112, it did not rely on
that fact. See 348 U. S., at 113 ("We adhere ... to the line drawn in the
Feres case between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or
in the course of military duty"). Moreover, it is the broad language that
consistently has been repeated in recent decisions describing the Feres
doctrine. See Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 299 ("Congress did not intend to subject the Government to ... claims [for injuries suffered by a
soldier in service] by a member of the Armed Forces") (emphasis added);
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 669 (In Feres
6
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Nor have the lower courts understood this fact to be relevant
under Feres. 8 Instead, the Feres doctrine has been applied
consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members
... the Court held that an on-duty serviceman who is injured due to the
negligence of Government officials may not recover against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act") (emphasis added); Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31, n. 25 (1953) (characterizing the Feres cases
as involving "injuries ... allegedly caused by negligence of employees of
the United States) (emphasis added).
8
The list of cases compiled by the dissent in this case, 779 F. 2d 1492,
1495-1496 (1986), in which the lower courts have interpreted Feres to bar
suit against the Government even though the negligence alleged was on the
part of a civilian employee is worth repeating: Potts v. United States, 723
F. 2d 20 (CA6 1983) (Navy corpsman injured when struck by a broken
cable from a hoist operated by civilians), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 959 (1984);
Warner v. United States, 720 F. 2d 837 (CA5 1983) (off-duty Army enlisted
man injured on base when motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by
civilian government employee); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F . 2d 1226
(CA3 1981) (serviceman injured by radiation exposure allegedly due in part
to intentional tort of civilian Department of Defense employees), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 972 (1982); Lewis v. United States, 663 F. 2d 889 (CA9
1981) (Marine Corps pilot killed in crash allegedly due to negligence of government maintenance employees), cert. denied, 457 U. S. 1133 (1982); Carter v. Cheyenne, 649 F. 2d 827 (CAlO 1981) (Air Force captain killed in
crash at city airport for which city brought third-party claim against FAA
air traffic controllers); Woodside v. United States, 606 F. 2d 134 (CA6 1979)
(Air Force officer killed in plane crash allegedly due to negligence of civilian flight instructor employed by military flight club), cert. denied, 445
U. S. 904 (1980); Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (CA9 1979)
(see n. 3, supra), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980); Watkins v.' United
States, 462 F. Supp. 980 (SD Ga. 1978) (serviceman killed on base when
motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by civilian government employee), aff'd, 587 F. 2d 279 (CA5 1979); Hass v. United States, 518 F . 2d
1138 (CA4 1975) (suit by serviceman against civilian manager of militaryowned horse stable); United States v. Lee, 400 F. 2d 558 (CA9 1968) (serviceman killed in crash of military aircraft allegedly due to FAA air traffic
controller negligence), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1053 (1969); Sheppard v.
United States, 369 F. 2d 272 (CA3 1966) (same), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 982
(1967); Layne v. United States, 295 F. 2d 433 (CA71961) (National Guardsman killed on training flight allegedly due to negligence of civilian air traffic controllers), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 990 (1962); United Air Lines, Inc .
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against the Government based upon service-related injuries.
We decline to modify the doctrine at this late date. 9
A

This Court has emphasized three broad rationales underlying the Feres decision. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp.
v. United States, 431 U. S. 666, 671-673 (1977), and n. 2,
supra. An examination of these reasons for the doctrine
demonstrates that the status of the alleged tortfeasor does
not have the critical significance ascribed to it by the Court of
Appeals in this case. First, "[t]he relationship between the
Government and members of its armed forces is 'distinctively
federal in character."' Feres, 340 U. S., at 143 (quoting
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305 (1947)).
This federal relationship is implicated to the greatest degree
v. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379 (CA9) (serviceman injured in part due to alleged
CAA employee negligence), cert. dismissed sub nom., United Air Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 951 (1964).
9
JUSTICE SCALIA indicates that he would consider overruling Feres had
this been requested by counsel, but in the absence of such a request he
would "confine the unfairness and irrationality [of] that decision" to cases
where the allegations of negligence are limited to other members of the
military. Post, at - - . In arguing "unfairness" in this case, JUSTICE
SCALIA assumes that had respondent been "piloting a commercial helicopter" his family might recover substantially more in damages than it now
may recover under the benefit programs available for a serviceman and his
family, post, at--. It hardly need be said that predicting the·outcome
of any damage suit-both with respect to liability and the amount of damages-is hazardous, whereas veterans' benefits are guaranteed by law.
Post, at - - . If "fairness"-in terms of pecuniary benefits-were the
issue, one could respond to the dissent's assumption by noting that had the
negligent instructions that led to Johnson's death been given by another
serviceman, the consequences-under the dissent's view-would be
equally "unfair." "Fairness" provides no more justification for the line
drawn by the dissent than it does for the line upon which application of the
Feres doctrine has always depended: whether the injury was "incident to
service"? In sum, the dissent's argument for changing the interpretation
of a congressional statute, when Congress has failed to do so for almost 40
years, is unconvincing.
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when a service member is performing activities incident to
his federal service. Performance of the military function in
diverse parts of the country and the world entails a "[s]ignificant risk of accidents and injuries." Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 672. Where a service
member is injured incident to service-that is, because of his
military relationship with the Government-it "makes no
sense to permit the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negligence to affect the liability of the Government to [the] serviceman." Ibid. Instead, application of the underlying federal remedy that provides "simple, certain, and uniform
compensation for injuries or death of those in armed services," Feres, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted), is appropriate.
Second, the existence of these generous statutory disability and death benefits is an independent reason why the
Feres doctrine bars suit for service-related injuries. 10 In
Feres, the Court observed that the primary purpose of the
FTCA "was to extend a remedy to those who had been without; if it incidentally benefited those already well provided
for, it appears to have been unintentional." 340 U. S., at
140. Those injured during the course of activity incident to
service not only receive benefits that "compare extremely favorably with those provided by most workmen's compensation statutes," id., at 145, but the recovery of benefits is
"swift [and] efficient," Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States, supra, at 673, "normally requir[ing] no litigation," Feres, supra, at 145. The Court in Feres found ·it difficult to believe that Congress would have provided such a
comprehensive system of benefits while at the same time
contemplating recovery for service-related injuries under the
Service members receive numerous other benefits unique to their
service status. For example, members of the military and their dependents are eligible for educational benefits, extensive health benefits, homebuying loan benefits, and retirement benefits after a minimum of 20 years
of service. See generally Uniformed Services Almanac (L. Sharff & S.
Gordon eds. 1985).
10

85-2039-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. JOHNSON

9

FTCA. Particularly persuasive was the fact that Congress
"omitted any provision to adjust these two types of remedy
to each other." I d., at 144. Congress still has not amended
the Veterans' Benefits Act or the FTCA to make any such
provision for injuries incurred during the course of activity
incident to service. We thus find no reason to modify what
the Court has previously found to be the law: the statutory
veterans' benefits "provid[e] an upper limit of liability for the
Government as to service-connected injuries." Stencel v.
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 673.
See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460,
464 (1980) (per curiam) ("[T]he Veterans' Benefits Act provided compensation to injured servicemen, which we understood Congress intended to be the sole remedy for serviceconnected injuries").
Third, Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by
service members against the Government for injuries incurred incident to service are barred by the F eres doctrine
because they are the "type[s] of claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness."
United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 59 (emphasis in original). In every respect the military is, as this Court has recognized, "a specialized society." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S.
733, 743 (1974). "[T]o accomplish its mission the military
must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and
esprit de corps." Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. s'. --,
- - (1986). Even if military negligence is not specifically
alleged in a tort action, a suit based upon service-related activity necessarily implicates the military judgments and decisions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of
the military mission. 11 Moreover, military discipline inCivilian employees of the Government also may play an integral role in
military activities. In this circumstance, an inquiry into the civilian activities would have the same effect on military discipline as a direct inquiry
into military judgments. For example, the FAA and the United States
11
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volves not only obedience to orders, but more generally duty
and loyalty to one's service and to one's country. Suits
brought by service members against the Government for
service-related injuries could undermine the commitment essential to effective service and thus have the potential to disrupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the word.
B
In this case, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed
while performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a primary duty of the Coast Guard. See 14 U. S. C. §§ 2,
88(a)(1). 12 There is no dispute that Johnson's injury arose directly out of the rescue mission, or that the mission was an
activity incident to his military service. Johnson went on
the rescue mission specifically because of his military status.
His wife received and is continuing to receive statutory benefits on account of his death. Because Johnson was acting
pursuant to standard operating procedures of the Coast
Guard, the potential that this suit could implicate military
discipline is substantial. The circumstances of this case thus
fall within the heart of the Feres doctrine as it consistently
has been articulated.

III
We reaffirm the holding of Feres that "the Government is
not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injurjes to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Armed Services have an established working relationship that provides for
FAA participation in numerous military activities. See FAA, United
States Dept. of Transportation, Handbook 7610.4F: Special Military Operations (Jan. 21 , 1981).
2
' The Coast Guard, of course, is a military service, and an important
branch of the armed services. 14 U. S. C. § 1.
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court
This case presents the question whether the doctrine established in Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135 (1950), bars
an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act on behalf of a
service member killed during the course of an activity incident to service, where the complaint alleges negligence on
the part of civilian employees of the Federal Government.
I
Lieutenant Commander Horton Winfield Johnson was a
helicopter pilot for the United States Coast Guard, stationed
in Hawaii. In the early morning of January 7, 1982, Johnson's Coast Guard station received a distress call from a boat
lost in the area. Johnson and a crew of several other Coast
Guard members were dispatched to search for the vessel.
Inclement weather decreased the visibility, and so Johnson
requested radar assistance from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), a civilian agency of the Federal Government. The FAA controllers assumed positive radar control
over the helicopter. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter
crashed into the side of a mountain on the island of Molokai.
All the crew members, including Johnson, were killed in the
crash.

_,. . .
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Respondent, Johnson's wife, applied for and received compensation for her husband's death pursuant to the Veterans'
Benefits Act, 72 Stat. 1118, as amended, 38 U. S. C. § 301 et
seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III). 1 In addition, she filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680. Her complaint sought damages
from the United States on the ground that the FAA flight
controllers negligently caused her husband's death. The
Government filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that because
Johnson was killed during the course of his military duties,
respondent could not recover damages from the United
States. The District Court agreed and dismissed the complaint, relying exclusively on this Court's decision in Feres.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.
749 F. 2d 1530 (1985). It noted the language of Feres that
precludes suits by service members against the Government
for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. The court found,
however, that the evolution of the doctrine since the Feres
decision warranted a qualification of the original holding according to the status of the alleged tortfeasor. The court
identified what it termed "the tjpical Feres factual paradigm" that exists when a service member alleges negligence
on the part of another member of the military. 749 F. 2d, at
1537. "[W]hen the Feres factual paradigm is present, the
issue is whether the injury arose out of or during the course
of an activity incident to service." Ibid. But when negligence is alleged on the part of a Federal Government em'Respondent has received $35,690.66 in life insurance, a $3,000 death
gratuity, and receives approximately $868 per month in dependency and
compensatory benefits. Brief for United States 3, n. 1. The dependency
and compensatory benefits normally are payable for the life of the surviving spouse and include an extra monthly sum for any surviving child of the
veteran below age 18. See 38 U. S. C. §§ 410, 411 (1982 ed. and Supp.
Ill); 38 CFR § 3.461 (1986).
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ployee who is not a member of the military, the court found
that the propriety of a suit should be determined by examining the rationales that underlie the Feres doctrine. Although it noted that this Court has articulated numerous rationales for the doctrine, 2 it found the effect of a suit on
military discipline to be the doctrine's primary justification.
Applying its new analysis to the facts of this case, the court
found "absolutely no hint . . . that the conduct of any alleged
tortfeasor even remotely connected to the military will be
scrutinized if this case proceeds to trial." 749 F. 2d, at 1539.
Accordingly, it found that Feres did not bar respondent's
suit. The court acknowledged that the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, "in a case strikingly similar to this one, has
reached the opposite conclusion." 749 F. 2d, at 1539. (citing Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (1979), cert.
denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980)). 3 It concluded, however, that
"Uptegrove was wrongly decided," 749. F. 2d, at 1539. and declined to reach the same result.
'We have identified three factors that underlie the Feres doctrine:
"First, the relationship between the Government and members of its
Armed Forces is" 'distinctively federal in character,'"; it would make little
sense to have the Government's liability to members of the Armed Services
dependent on the fortuity of where the soldier happened to be stationed at
the time of the injury. Second, the Veterans' Benefits Act establishes, as
a substitute for tort liability, a statutory 'no fault' compensation scheme
which provides generous pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to
any negligence attributable to the Government. A third factor ... [is]
'[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military
duty .... '" Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U. S.
666, 671-672 (1977) (citations omitted).
3
In Uptegrove, the wife of a Navy lieutenant killed while flying home on
an Air Force C-141 transport brought suit against the Government under
the FTCA, alleging negligence on the part of three FAA air traffic controllers. The court in Uptegrove dismissed the suit on the basis of Feres.
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The Court of Appeals granted the Government's suggestion for rehearing en bane. The en bane court found that this
Court's recent decision in United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S.
52 (1985) "reinforc[ed] the analysis set forth in the panel opinion," 779 F. 2d 1492, 1493 (1986) (per curiam), particularly
the "[s]pecial emphasis . . . upon military discipline and
whether or not the claim being considered would require civilian courts to second-guess military decisions," id., at
1493-1494. It concluded that the panel properly had evaluated the claim under Feres and therefore reinstated the panel
opm10n. Judge Johnson, joined by three other judges,
strongly dissented. The dissent rejected the "Feres factual
paradigm" as identified by the court, finding that because
"Johnson's injury was undoubtedly sustained incident to
service, ... under current law our decision ought to be a relatively straightforward affirmance." I d., at 1494.
We granted certiorari, 479 U. S. - - (1986), to review the
Court of Appeals' reformulation of the Feres doctrine and to
resolve the conflict among the Circuits on the issue. 4 We
now reverse.
II
In F.eres, this Court held that service members cannot
bring tort suits against the Government for injuries that
"arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146. This Court has never deviated
from this characterization of the F eres bar. 5 Nor has Congress changed this standard in the close to 40 years since it
was articulated, even though, as the Court noted in Feres,
' In addition to the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
in Uptegrove, specifically acknowledged by the Court of Appeals in this
case, the decision conflicts in principle with the decisions of the Courts of
Appeals cited infra, n. 8.
6
See United States v. Brown, 348 U. S. 110, 112 (1954); United States
v. Muniz, 374 U. S. 150, 159 (1963); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States, supm, at 671; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U. S. 296, 299
(1983); United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S. 52, 57 (1985).
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Congress "possesses a ready remedy" to alter a misinterpretation of its intent. I d., at 138. 6 Although all of the cases
decided by this Court under Feres have involved allegations
of negligence on the part of members of the military, this
Court has never suggested that the military status of the alleged tortfeasor is crucial to the application of the doctrine. 7
' Congress has recently considered, but not enacted, legislation that
would allow service members to bring medical malpractice suits against the
Government. See H. R. 1161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H. R. 1942,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
7
In two places in the Feres opinion, the Court suggested that the military status of the tortfeasor might be relevant to its decision. First, the
Court identified "[t]he common fact underlying the three cases" as being
"that each claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained
injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces." 340 U. S., at 138
(emphasis added). Second, in discussing one of several grounds for the
holding, the Court stated: "It would hardly be a rational plan of providing
for those disabled in service by others in service to leave them dependent
upon geographic considerations over which they have no control." I d., at
143 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the language of the opinion, viewed
as a whole, is broad: "We know of no American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either his superior officers
or the Government he is serving," id., at 141 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted); "' . . . To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the
relations between soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal
incidents and consequences of the relation between persons in service and
the Government are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by federal authority."' Id., at 143-144 (quoting United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305-306 (1947)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See id., at 142 (finding relevant "the status of both the
wronged and the wrongdoer") (emphasis added).
Although one decision since Feres noted the military status of the
tortfeasors, see United States v. Brown, supra, at 112, it did not rely on
that fact . See 348 U. S., at 113 ("We adhere ... to the line drawn in the
Feres case between injuries that did and injuries that did not arise out of or
in the course of military duty"). Moreover, it is the broad language that
consistently has been repeated in recent decisions describing the Feres
doctrine. See Chappell v. Wallace, supra, at 299 ("Congress did not intend to subject the Government to . . . claims [for injuries suffered by a
soldier in service] by a member of the Armed Forces") (emphasis added);
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Nor have the lower courts understood this fact to be relevant
under Feres. 8 Instead, the Feres doctrine has been applied
consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 669 (In Feres
... the Court held that an on-duty serviceman who is injured due to the
negligence of Government officials may not recover against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act") (emphasis added); Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U. S. 15, 31, n. 25 (1953) (characterizing the Feres cases
as involving "injuries ... allegedly caused by negligence of employees of
the United States) (emphasis added).
8
The list of cases compiled by the dissent in this case, 779 F. 2d 1492,
1495-1496 (1986), in which the lower courts have interpreted Feres to bar
suit against the Government even though the negligence alleged was on the
part of a civilian employee is worth repeating: Potts v. United States, 723
F. 2d 20 (CA6 1983) (Navy corpsman injured when struck by a broken
cable from a hoist operated by civilians), cert. denied, 466 U. S. 959 (1984);
Warner v. United States, 720 F . 2d 837 (CA5 1983) (off-duty Army enlisted
man injured on base when motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by
civilian government employee); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F. 2d 1226
(CA3 1981) (serviceman injured by radiation exposure allegedly due in part
to intentional tort of civilian Department of Defense employees), cert. denied, 456 U. S. 972 (1982); Lewis v. United States, 663 F. 2d 889 (CA9
1981) (Marine Corps pilot killed in crash allegedly due to negligence of government maintenance employees), cert. denied, 457 U. S. 1133 (1982); Carter v. Cheyenne, 649 F. 2d 827 (CAlO 1981) (Air Force captain killed in
crash at city airport for which city brought third-party claim against FAA
air traffic controllers); Woodside v. United States, 606 F. 2d 134 (CA61979)
(Air Force officer killed in plane crash allegedly due to negligence of civilian flight instructor employed by military flight club), cert. denied, 445
U. S. 904 (1980); Uptegrove v. United States, 600 F. 2d 1248 (CA9 1979)
(see n. 3, supra), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 1044 (1980); Watkins v. United
States, 462 F. Supp. 980 (SD Ga. 1978) (serviceman killed on base when
motorcycle collided with shuttle bus driven by civilian government employee), aff'd, 587 F. 2d 279 (CA5 1979); Hass v. United States, 518 F. 2d
1138 (CA4 1975) (suit by serviceman against civilian manager of militaryowned horse stable); United States v. Lee, 400 F. 2d 558 (CA9 1968) (serviceman killed in crash of military aircraft allegedly due to FAA air traffic
controller negligence), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1053 (1969); Sheppard v.
United States, 369 F. 2d 272 (CA31966) (same), cert. denied, 386 U. S. 982
(1967); Layne v. United States, 295 F. 2d 433 (CA 7 1961) (National Guardsman killed on training flight allegedly due to negligence of civilian air traf-
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against the Government based upon service-related injuries.
We decline to modify the doctrine at this late date. 9
A
This Court has emphasized three broad rationales underlying the Feres decision. See Stencel Aero Engineering Corp.
v. United States, 431 U. S. 666, 671-673 (1977), and n. 2,
supra. An examination of these reasons for the doctrine
demonstrates that the status of the alleged tortfeasor does
not have the critical significance ascribed to it by the Court of
Appeals in this case. First, "[t]he relationship between the
Government and members of its armed forces is 'distinctively
federal in character."' Feres, 340 U. S., at 143 (quoting
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U. S. 301, 305 (1947)).
This federal relationship is implicated to the greatest degree
fie controllers), cert. denied, 368 U. S. 990 (1962); United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Wiener, 335 F. 2d 379 (CA9) (serviceman injured in part due to alleged
CAA employee negligence), cert. dismissed sub nom., United Air Lines,
Inc . v. United States, 379 U. S. 951 (1964).
9
JUSTICE SCALIA indicates that he would consider overruling Feres had
this been requested by counsel, but in the absence of such a request he
would "confine the unfairness and irrationality [of] that decision" to cases
where the allegations of negligence are limited to other members of the
military. Post, at - - . In arguing "unfairness" in this case, JUSTICE
SCALIA assumes that had respondent been "piloting a commercial helicopter" his family might recover substantially more in damages than it now
may recover under the benefit programs available for a serviceman and his
family. Post, at--. It hardly need be said that predicting the outcome
of any damage suit-both with respect to liability and the amount of damages-is hazardous, whereas veterans' benefits are guaranteed by law.
Post, at - - . If "fairness"-in terms of pecuniary benefits-were the
issue, one could respond to the dissent's assumption by noting that had the
negligent instructions that led to Johnson's death been given by another
serviceman, the consequences-under the dissent's view-would be
equally "unfair." "Fairness" provides no more justification for the line
drawn by the dissent than it does for the line upon which application of the
Feres doctrine has always depended: whether the injury was "incident to
service"? In sum, the dissent's argument for changing the interpretation
of a congressional statute, when Congress has failed to do so for almost 40
years, is unconvincing.
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when a service member is performing activities incident to
his federal service. Performance of the military function in
diverse parts of the country and the world entails a "[s]ignificant risk of accidents and injuries." Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 672. Where a service
member is injured incident to service-that is, because of his
military relationship with the Government-it "makes no
sense to permit the fortuity of the situs of the alleged negligence to affect the liability of the Government to [the] serviceman." Ibid. Instead, application of the underlying federal remedy that provides "simple, certain, and uniform
compensation for injuries or death of those in armed services," Feres, supra, at 144 (footnote omitted), is appropriate.
Second, the existence of these generous statutory disability and death benefits is an independent reason why the
Feres doctrine bars suit for service-related injuries. 10 In
Feres, the Court observed that the primary purpose of the
FTCA "was to extend a remedy to those who had been without; if it incidentally benefited those already well provided
for, it appears to have been unintentional." 340 U. S., at
140. Those injured during the course of activity incident to
service not only receive benefits that "compare extremely favorably with those provided by most workmen's compensation statutes," id., at 145, but the recovery of benefits is
"swift [and] efficient," Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v.
United States, supra, at 673, "normally requir[ing] no litigation," Feres, supra, at 145. The Court in Feres found it difficult to believe that Congress would have provided such a
comprehensive system of benefits while at the same time
contemplating recovery for service-related injuries under the
10
Service members receive numerous other benefits unique to their
service status. For example, members of the military and their dependents are eligible for educational benefits, extensive health benefits, homebuying loan benefits, and retirement benefits after a minimum of 20 years
of service. See generally Uniformed Services Almanac (1. Sharff & S.
Gordon eds. 1985).
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FTCA. Particularly persuasive was the fact that Congress
"omitted any provision to adjust these two types of remedy
to each other." ld., at 144. Congress still has not amended
the Veterans' Benefits Act or the FTCA to make any such
provision for injuries incurred during the course of activity
incident to service. We thus find no reason to modify what
the Court has previously found to be the law: the statutory
veterans' benefits "provid[e] an upper limit of liability for the
Government as to service-connected injuries." Stencel v.
Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 673.
See Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U. S. 460,
464 (1980) (per curiam) ("[T]he Veterans' Benefits Act provided compensation to injured servicemen, which we understood Congress intended to be the sole remedy for serviceconnected injuries").
Third, Feres and its progeny indicate that suits brought by
service members against the Government for injuries incurred incident to service are barred by the Feres doctrine
because they are the "type[ s] of claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness."
United States v. Shearer, 473 U. S., at 59 (emphasis in original). In every respect the military is, as this Court has recognized, "a specialized society." Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S.
733, 743 (1974). "[T]o accomplish its mission the military
must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and
esprit de corps." Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U. S. - - ,
- - (1986). Even if military negligence is not specifically
alleged in a tort action, a suit based upon service-related activity necessarily implicates the military judgments and decisions that are inextricably intertwined with the conduct of
the military mission.u Moreover, military discipline in" Civilian employees of the Government also may play an integral role in
military activities. In this circumstance, an inquiry into the civilian activities would have the same effect on military discipline as a direct inquiry
into military judgments. For example, the FAA and the United States
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volves not only obedience to orders, but more generally duty
and loyalty to one's service and to one's country. Suits
brought by service members against the Government for
service-related injuries could undermine the commitment essential to effective service and thus have the potential to disrupt military discipline in the broadest sense of the word.
B

In this case, Lieutenant Commander Johnson was killed
while performing a rescue mission on the high seas, a primary duty of the Coast Guard. See 14 U. S. C. §§ 2,
88(a)(1). 12 There is no dispute that Johnson's injury arose directly out of the rescue mission, or that the mission was an
activity incident to his military service. Johnson went on
the rescue mission specifically because of his military status.
His wife received and is continuing to receive statutory benefits on account of his death. Because Johnson was acting
pursuant to standard operating procedures of the Coast
Guard, the potential that this suit could implicate military
discipline is substantial. The circumstances of this case thus
fall within the heart of the Feres doctrine as it consistently
has been articulated.
III
We reaffirm the holding of Feres that "the Government is
not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the
course of activity incident to service." 340 U. S., at 146.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Armed Services have an established working relationship that provides for
FAA participation in numerous military activities. See FAA, United
States Dept. of Transportation, Handbook 7610.4F: Special Military Operations (Jan. 21, 1981).
12
The Coast Guard , of course, is a military service, and an important
branch of the armed services. 14 U. S. C. § 1.

